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A MADISONIAN CASE FOR DISCLOSURE
Anthony Johnstone*
INTRODUCTION
Proponents of disclosure cheered, and proponents of broader campaign
finance regulation found solace in, the secondary holding in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission' that there is "no constitutional impedi-
ment" to requiring disclosure of those who fund independent campaign
expenditures.2 More than merely endorsing the constitutionality of the fed-
eral electioneering communication disclosure and disclaimer requirements,
the Supreme Court embraced "transparency [that] enables the electorate to
make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
messages."' Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court heralded a new era of
"effective disclosure" for campaign spending that "ha[d] not existed before
today."' Modern communications, especially the Internet, promptly "pro-
vide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corpora-
tions and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters."'
Unlike the narrowly divided five-to-four primary holding on corporate
campaign spending, this vision of a new transparency in politics gained the
support of eight justices, with only Justice Thomas dissenting.
Yet the case for campaign finance disclosure is not as clear as Citizens
United would suggest. A few months later the case of John Doe #1 v. Reed'
laid bare that holding's shallow foundations. In that case, the Court splin-
tered on the questions of whether, and how, disclosure of basic political
activity burdened speech, and what state interests might justify such a bur-
den. The six-member majority coalesced around a broadly worded holding
that, on its face, the disclosure of voter signatures supporting a referendum
"would not violate the First Amendment with respect to referendum peti-
tions in general."' Even so, the Court acknowledged that it was not address-
ing whether "controversial" petition campaigns-those most likely to give
* Assistant Professor, The University of Montana School of Law. Thanks to Richard Briffault,
Richard Hasen, Michael Kang, Neomi Rao, and participants in the University of Montana faculty collo-
quium for their comments, to Sean Clerget for his editing, and to my family for their support.
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2 Id. at 916.
3 id.
4 Id
5 Id.
6 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
7 Id. at 282 1.
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rise to strong interests for and against disclosure-might be constitutionally
protected from disclosure.! Only Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy
did not write separately. Knowing that the as-applied challenge still lay
before the lower courts, every other Justice signed onto one of six separate
opinions, each proposing a different balance between the individual burdens
and state interests at issue in the disclosure of political activity.' Justice
Thomas alone dissented in support of the facial challenge, but Justice Alito
suggested he also would side with plaintiffs' "strong case" in an as-applied
challenge. o
The constitutional basis for campaign finance disclosure, therefore,
remains theoretically underdeveloped. The commonly cited "informational
interest," described in Citizens United simply as "a governmental interest in
'provid[ing] the electorate with information' about the sources of election-
related spending,"" does not itself suggest who should disclose what, or
how. The Supreme Court's modem analysis of campaign finance disclosure
tends to assume rather than explain the informational interest. The basis for
the informational interest did not occupy more than a paragraph of the
Court's discussion in the leading and exceptionally lengthy cases of Buck-
ley v. Valeol2 and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission." The short
discussion of the informational interest in Citizens United elaborated on
citations to Buckley and McConnell, but did so by broadening its applica-
tion without deepening its justification. 4
Recent scholarship on campaign finance disclosure has highlighted the
informational interest, but done so mostly by considering how well various
disclosure regimes fit that interest." In doctrinal terms under the "exacting
SId at 2820-21.
9 See id. at 2822 (Breyer, J., concurring); id at 2822-24 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2829 (So-
tomayor, J., concurring); Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2829-31 (Stevens, J., concurring in part); id. at 2832
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2837 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 2827 (Alito, J., concurring).
11 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (alteration in original)
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (per curiam)).
12 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976).
13 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003); see also Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure
of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 3 ELEC. L.J. 251, 253-54 (2004)
(noting "the Court decided the key disclosure question without engaging in a complex analysis of the
question" and "McConnell sheds little light" on important disclosure questions).
14 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914-16.
15 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELEC. L.J. 273, 303 (2010)
(arguing that disclosure "needs to be reformulated in light of modern communications technology, the
extremist strain in contemporary political discourse, and a better understanding of just how disclosed
information is used by the voters and can be used to educate the public"); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclo-
sures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 257 (2010) (addressing, in part, "whether the existing
disclosure and disclaimer rules result in more informed voters and if they do not, whether any disclosure
and disclaimer regime would be more likely to accomplish this goal"); Scott M. Noveck, Campaign
Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 75, 76 (2010) (arguing that "a
[VOL. 19:2414
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scrutiny" applicable to disclosure, these scholars address the question of
what type of disclosure might bear a "substantial relationship" to the infor-
mational interest more than why that interest is "sufficiently important" to
government.'" Yet as long as disclosure remains under scrutiny, the latter
"sufficiently important ends" question will be as critical to the constitution-
al analysis of the informational interest as the former "substantially related
means" question. Without a clear constitutional justification, the informa-
tional interest does less than it might to define the means and ends of dis-
closure policy, and to defend that policy against constitutional challenge.
This Article proposes a deeper answer to the question of what consti-
tutes sufficiently important ends than the Supreme Court or scholars have
yet provided for the informational interest. It does so by excavating the
existing constitutional foundations for campaign finance disclosure, and
rooting the informational interest in a republican idea of corruption that
predates the narrow conception of corruption dominant in contemporary
political speech debates. That idea is older than the First Amendment itself,
and shares the same origin in the republican theory of James Madison. It is
the idea of faction discussed in The Federalist No. 10, what we now might
call a "special interest group" whose common interest is "adverse to the
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.""
Madison's concern with faction motivates an antifactional informa-
tional interest both broader and narrower than presently conceived.'" It is
broader in the sense that informing voters through disclosure of a wide
range of interests in political campaigns is critical to the full function of the
Constitution's antifactional machinery. It is narrower in the sense that the
interest is in disclosing interests-factions-and not other information that
voters may find valuable for other reasons. Rooted in the broad importance
and narrow purpose of antifactionalism, a deeper informational interest may
defend certain campaign finance disclosure regimes against constitutional
attacks in ways a shallower informational interest cannot.
carefully crafted disclosure scheme, reporting selected aggregate data rather than the individual identify-
ing information currently published, can overcome these significant constitutional concerns, while at the
same time providing a rich and valuable source of information to aid both voters and policymakers
alike"); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Poli-
tics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057, 1102-04 (discussing "[p]olicy
[t]ake-[a]ways" for "states that wish to freshen up their disclosure laws to make sure that the laws are
capturing the way modem campaigns are waged"). See generally Campaign Disclosure Project Sympo-
sium Part One, 4 ELEC. L.J. 279 (2005); Campaign Disclosure Project Symposium Part Two, 6 ELEC.
L.J. 36 (2007).
16 See, e.g., Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 15, at 1091.
17 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
18 The interest is "antifactional" in the sense of working against factions or counterbalancing
factional forces within the system of government, not in the sense of eliminating factions. Madison (and
this Article) take factions as a given in governing any pluralist society.
2012] 415
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The argument has three parts. Part I considers the existing constitu-
tional foundations of the means and ends of campaign finance disclosure,
identifying several doctrinal fissures that may undermine disclosure laws in
the future yet have received little attention in the commentary on Citizens
United. Part II proposes a revised conception of the underdeveloped infor-
mational interest as an antifactional interest. Rooted in Madisonian republi-
canism and translated to the modern practice of politics, it considers cam-
paign finance disclosure as a crucial part of the Constitution's broader anti-
factional project. By delegating the task of recognizing and countering fac-
tions to the people in election campaigns, disclosure emphasizes informed
popular sovereignty as the most effective check on factions consistent with
the First Amendment's republican purpose. So reconceived, an antifactional
interest in disclosure can recover the broader, more historically rooted form
of the anticorruption interest lost in Citizens United. Part III applies the
antifactional interest to begin to resolve several persistent controversies
arising from campaign finance disclosure. Consistent with several scholars'
recent critiques of the prevailing disclosure system's benefits and costs,
these deeper antifactional ends suggest more focused means of disclosure
for individuals, organizations, "foreign" campaign participants, and issue
advocacy.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISCLOSURE
Campaign finance attribution" needs a more robust constitutional
foundation than it has. Despite the Supreme Court's announcement that "[a]
campaign finance system that pairs corporate independent expenditures
with effective disclosure has not existed before today,"20 there is little more
consensus on what constitutes "effective disclosure" today than there was
on the status of corporate campaign speech before Citizens United. Reflect-
ing what several scholars have called the "hydraulics" of campaign finance,
political spending, like water, has responded to the pressures of new and
reformed disclosure regimes by flowing toward pseudonymous shelters and
loopholes in the same way contribution limits diverted money from "hard"
to "soft" to independent expenditures.2 1 At the federal level, independent
19 For the purposes of this Article, "disclosure" includes the broad array of tools to identify the
source of funding for campaign-related communications, including both reports to public agencies for
dissemination to the electorate and attribution of funding sources made at the same time as the commu-
nication.
20 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
21 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999); Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regula-
tion, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131 (2005). Adapting the hydraulics theory to securities law, Geoffrey Manne has
explained it usefully as follows: "The hydraulic theory of disclosure rules holds that, as disclosure rules
impose costs on behavior subject to disclosure, where behavior can be altered at a lower cost than the
416 [VOL. 19:2
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expenditures in campaigns have migrated from registered political action
committees under the Federal Election Campaign Act, to political advocacy
organizations registered under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, to
tax-exempt corporations registered under Section 501(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code, disclosing less at each step.22 The disclosure of funding for
groups broadcasting the now commonplace "issue ads" targeting candidates
during campaign season decreased from 71 percent of issue ad campaign
finance reports filed in 2004 to as low as 15 percent in 2010.23
In short, "disclosure failed colossally in the 2010 election," in what
one critic of current "upside-down" disclosure rules called an "absurd cli-
max, exposing numerous instances of small-scale citizen participation but
concealing the giant influence of financially and politically powerful enti-
ties."2 4 Contrary to the Supreme Court's assumption that its excision of cor-
porate expenditure restrictions had ushered in "[a] campaign finance system
that pairs corporate independent expenditures with effective disclosure," 25
both Congress and many states are responding to Citizens United with revi-
sions to their campaign finance laws that address perceived gaps in their
disclosure systems.26
Meanwhile, broad attacks on campaign finance laws continue. Advo-
cates who led the charge against expenditure restrictions that eventually
ended with Citizens United have turned their focus to disclosure require-
ments. 27 For example, Professor Bradley Smith, a former Federal Election
cost of disclosure, disclosure rules will induce behavioral changes rather than increased information
flow." Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs ofDisclo-
sure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 485 (2007).
22 See Cory G. Kalanick, Note, Blowing Up the Pipes: The Use of (c)(4) to Dismantle Campaign
Finance Reform, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2254, 2257-66 (2011) (explaining the rise of the Section 527 organi-
zation and the recent migration of campaign expenditures to Section 501(c)(4) groups).
23 T.W. Farnam, Disclosure of issue Ad' Funding Is on the Wane, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2010,
at A23; see also Human Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1008 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010)
("Alarmingly, as levels in political spending rise dramatically, the percentage of independent entities
disclosing information about where that political spending comes from has sharply declined." (citing
Editorial, The Secret Election, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at 8 (reporting that "[iln 2004 and 2006,
virtually all independent groups receiving electioneering donations revealed their donors," while "[i]n
2008, less than half . .. reported their donors" and only 32 percent in 2010))), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1477 (2011).
24 William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 864 (2011).
25 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
26 See, e.g., Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act
(DISCLOSE Act), H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010); Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on
Spending in Elections Act (DISCLOSE Act), S. 3295, 111th Cong. (2010); Life After Citizens United,
NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607
#states respond (showing that ten states have enacted disclosure or disclaimer requirements for corpo-
rate political expenditures).
27 See Eliza Newlin Carney, Campaign Finance Fight Moves to Disclosure, NAT'L J. (May 3,
2010, 9:33 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/rules-of-the-game/campaign-finance-fight-
2012] 417
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Commission Chair, contends that campaign finance disclosure carries un-
appreciated costs in terms of privacy invasion, potential government retalia-
tion, and even the quality of public discourse. 28 He argues that of all the
various means of campaign finance regulation, "the idea that Americans
should report their political activity to the government is, in many ways, the
most un-American part of that agenda."2 9 Another leading critic of cam-
paign finance regulation, Cato Scholar John Samples, questions whether
disclosure does more harm than good to democratic deliberation.30 "Disclo-
sure prompts voters to act on prior beliefs that have not been updated by
new information or arguments," he argues, and "will encourage debate
about the origins of electoral messages rather than about their truth, which
may be counted a cost to society insofar as fostering illogical or irrational
debates ill serves a deliberative democracy."' Professor James L. Huffman
observed that as a challenger candidate for the U.S. Senate, "public disclo-
sure of contributions in the small amounts permitted by federal law" chills
the support of some otherwise sympathetic donors who depend on relation-
ships with the incumbent, making "the mountain to be climbed by most
challengers even steeper."32 Other scholars raise narrower questions about
the privacy costs of disclosure rules in their existing forms, particularly
focusing on the impact of campaign finance Internet disclosures.33 These
new critiques, based on the experiences of political actors with reason to
question the "effective disclosure" heralded by Citizens United, are likely to
sharpen the constitutional arguments against broad disclosure regimes with
shallow theoretical roots.
moves-to-disclosure-20100503 ("Disclosure has become ground zero in the campaign finance wars now
that the Supreme Court has lifted restrictions on political spending by corporations, unions and activist
groups."); see also Dick M. Carpenter II, Disclosure Costs: Unintended Consequences of Campaign
Finance Reform, INST. FOR JUST. 14 (2007), http://www.ij.org/images/pdf folder/other pubs/Disclosure
Costs.pdf (proposing repeal of all campaign finance disclosure laws in ballot issue elections).
28 Bradley A. Smith, In Defense of Political Anonymity, CITY J., Winter 2010, at 74, 75, 78.
29 Id. at 78.
30 See generally John Samples, The DISCLOSE Act, Deliberation, and the First Amendment,
CATO INST. (June 28, 2010), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa664.pdf.
31 Id. at 7.
32 James L. Huffman, How Donor Disclosure Hurts Democracy, WALL ST. J., Apr. I1, 2011, at
A13.
33 See, e.g., Deborah G. Johnson et al., Campaign Disclosure, Privacy and Transparency, 19 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 959, 982 (2011) (arguing that the purposes underlying campaign finance "transpa-
rency" should be reexamined to "take into account the nature of the Internet and the value of privacy");
McGeveran, supra note 24, at 860 ("The time is ripe to reconsider the Court's cramped view of privacy
in politics. Thanks to the internet, the intrusiveness of disclosure has grown greater than ever before.");
see also James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 927,
956 (2011) (arguing that the desirability of anonymity or publicity in political life, including campaign
finance disclosure, should be assessed according to their effect on the disclosing citizens' tendency to
"consensus norms of ideal democratic behavior").
[VOL. 19:2418
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These arguments are propelling a new wave of constitutional chal-
lenges to federal and state disclosure laws that are working their way
through district and circuit courts.34 In a survey of judicial responses to the
disclosure holding of Citizens United, Professor Ciara Torres-Spelliscy
declares that the "tide has turned" in favor of disclosure, noting that the first
wave of challenges has ebbed with a series of dismissals or other decisions
upholding disclosure laws at the state and federal levels." Yet as policy-
makers and political actors focus on disclosure as one of the few remaining
tools of campaign finance regulation, the tide may turn again. Notwith-
standing courts' recent deference to disclosure in the immediate wake of
Citizens United, future cases are likely to lead to a judicial reexamination of
the informational interest in disclosure for at least three reasons.
First, the special "exacting scrutiny" standard applicable to disclosure
is less stable doctrinally than either strict scrutiny or rational basis review.
A "substantial relationship" to "a sufficiently important governmental inter-
est" requires courts to find significant justifications for both the means and
ends of disclosure. Courts' assessment of those justifications, as well as the
standard itself, may be more subject to change than either strict scrutiny or
34 See, e.g., Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304, 307-08 (8th Cir.
2011), reh'g en banc granted, (July 12, 2011); The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 344-45 (4th Cir. 2009) (challenging FEC registration and disclosure regulations
for independent expenditures), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010); Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell,
221 F.3d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 2000) (challenging Vermont's electioneering communication disclaimer and
disclosure laws); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, No. 4:10-cv-416 RP-TJS, 2011 WL
2649980, at *4, *13 (S.D. Iowa June 29, 2011) (declining to rule on the issue until the Iowa Supreme
Court ruled on the statutory interpretation); Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 735 F. Supp. 2d
994, 996-97 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (challenging Illinois's registration and reporting law for independent ex-
penditures); Nat'1 Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 723 F. Supp. 2d 245, 248 (D. Me. 2010) (challenging
Maine's ballot issue committee disclosure law), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 649 F.3d 34 (2011); Ctr.
for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Ireland, 613 F. Supp. 2d 777, 782 (S.D. W.Va. 2009) (challenging West
Virginia's "electioneering communication" definition); ProtectMariage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d
1197, 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (challenging California's ballot issue committee disclosure law); Koerber
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 583 F. Supp. 2d 740, 743, 747 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (challenging federal "political
committee" definition and "electioneering communication" disclosure laws (first internal quotation
marks omitted)); Verified Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, 8-9, Mont. Shrugged
Teaparty Patriots, Inc. v. Unsworth, No. 1:10-cv-000135-RFC-CSO (D. Mont. Oct. 27, 2010) (challeng-
ing Montana's campaign expenditure disclosure law); Verified Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive
Relief at 2, Family PAC v. Reed, No. 3:09-cv-05662-RBL (W.D. Wash. Oct. 21, 2009) (challenging
Washington's ballot issue committee disclosure laws); Ohio Right to Life Soc'y, Inc. v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, No. 2:08-cv-00492, 2008 WL 4186312, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2008) (challenging Ohio's
"electioneering communication" disclosure laws); Complaint at 2-3, Bailey v. Maine Comm'n on Go-
vernmental Ethics (Me. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2011); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, W.
Tradition P'ship v. Unsworth, No. BDV 2010-1120 (Mont. 1st Dist. Nov. 22, 2010) (challenging Mon-
tana political committee definition and disclosure laws).
35 Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 15, at 1084-85, 1104.
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rational basis review because, unlike those standards, "exacting scrutiny"
does not put a thumb on either side of the constitutional scale."
Second, recent legislation suggests the means of disclosure are likely
to become more sophisticated in response to political campaigns' increased
use of novel organizational forms beyond the traditional political commit-
tee, and novel media beyond the traditional broadcast communication or
mailer." The conventional disclosure regime is "loophole-ridden," allowing
"rampant circumvention of disclosure requirements by savvy big donors.""
Even the dissenting justices in Citizens United, usually deferential to and
optimistic about campaign finance regulation, joined Justice Kagan in a
more realistic judgment that "[s]imple disclosure fails to prevent shady
dealing."" As new laws expand beyond "simple disclosure," they will re-
quire courts to measure those laws under the "substantial relationship" test,
and that application will depend on the form of the informational interest
asserted.
Third, in rejecting corporate campaign-expenditure limits in Citizens
United, the Supreme Court also undermined the anticorruption and spend-
ing-limit enforcement interests that, with the informational interest, had
supported disclosure. It considered neither anticorruption nor enforcement
interests in its analysis of Citizens United's challenge to the disclosure of its
funding." Consequently, after Citizens United, heightened scrutiny, more
sophisticated political speakers, and the undermining of other state interests
will demand that the informational interest do most of the work of justify-
ing disclosure laws.
To understand how a reconceived informational interest might address
these challenges in the post-Citizens United future, it is helpful to turn
briefly to the origins of the informational interest in the pre-Buckley past.
Early in the development of modern political campaigns, courts and com-
mentators recognized disclosure as a basic safeguard to protect the integrity
of government against corruption. The classic formulation of the American
legal tradition of disclosure belongs to (future Justice) Louis Brandeis:
"Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseas-
es. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman."4 1 Originally a proposition of financial reform, to
"[c]ompel bankers when issuing securities to make public the commissions
36 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) (explaining that under exacting
scrutiny, "[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legisla-
tive judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility ofthe justification raised").
37 See, e.g., Human Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011).
38 McGeveran, supra note 24, at 860-61.
39 Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2829 (2011) (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
40 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915-16 (2010).
41 Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER'S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10, 10.
420 [VOt. 19:2
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or profits they are receiving" from what amounted to "other people's mon-
ey,"42 the publicity remedy also emerged in political reforms. In the Pro-
gressive Era, the "National Publicity Law Organization" and similar reform
groups pushed for "publicity laws" or more comprehensive "'corrupt prac-
tices' acts" in most states.43 These movements emerged in the wake of sev-
eral state and federal political scandals involving financial industry contri-
butions to elected officials at the turn of the Twentieth Century."
Louise Overacker, a leading historian and critic of the spending prohi-
bitions at the core of the early corrupt practices acts, favored disclosure
instead. "The real objection" to these turn-of-the-century political party
scandals, she argued in 1932, "was not that the money came from corpora-
tions but that the voters did not know who was paying the bills of the par-
ty." 45 For a scandalized public "the remedy is publicity, and more publici-
ty" rather than prohibition, which "simply forces [campaign spending] un-
der cover and out of the clarifying light of publicity."'
In 1910, federal law first required reporting of congressional political
committee contributions of $100 or more and expenditures of $10 or
more.47 The law also required independent political committees to report
expenditures of $50 or more annually.48 The Federal Corrupt Practices Act
of 1925 expanded reporting requirements to include presidential elections.49
In Burroughs v. United States,5 o a challenge to that Act as interfering with
state legislatures' Article II, Section 1 powers to direct the manner of ap-
pointing presidential electors, the Supreme Court upheld the law as within
Congress's power to protect elections against "the improper use of money
to influence the result."" The disclosure law, according to the Court, was
no less than an exercise of "the power of self protection. . . . to preserve the
departments and institutions of the general government from impairment or
destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption."52
Such strong language came from the Court's bold analogy to Ex Parte
Yarbrough," a Reconstruction Era voting rights case involving a racially
motivated beating intended to prevent the victim from voting in a federal
42 Id. at 10, 12.
43 LouISE OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 294 (Arno Press reprint ed. 1974) (1932).
44 See generally Adam Winkler, "Other People 's Money": Corporations, Agency Costs, and
Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEo. L.J. 871 (2004).
45 OVERACKER, supra note 43, at 202.
4 Id
47 Act ofJune 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (1910).
48 id.
49 Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-506, §§ 303-306, 43 Stat. 1070, 1071-72
(1925).
50 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
51 Id. at 545.
52 id.
53 10 U.S. 651 (1884).
2012]1 421
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congressional election.' Quoting Yarbrough, the Court analogized such
"lawless violence" to "the free use of money in elections, arising from the
vast growth of recent wealth in other quarters."' The soundness of Con-
gress's conclusion "that public disclosure of political contributions, togeth-
er with the names of contributors and other details, would tend to prevent
the corrupt use of money to affect elections," according to the Court, "rea-
sonably cannot be denied.""6
The Supreme Court's endorsement notwithstanding, these first-
generation disclosure laws left administration to Congress itself and, there-
fore, "were widely circumvented."" It was not until the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 and its post-Watergate amendments that Congress
required registration of political committees and reporting to a separate
Federal Election Commission of campaign contributions totaling $10 or
more and independent expenditures of $100 or more annually." These laws
set the stage for the Supreme Court's modem scrutiny of campaign finance
disclosure laws under the First Amendment in Buckley.
Today, First Amendment doctrine sustains two serious objections to
disclosure of political campaign participants. Disclosure of certain political
actors' identities or supporters can subject them to retaliation that chills the
expression of minority viewpoints. Compliance with disclosure laws also
can burden political speech with undue administrative costs. In response to
these objections came the traditional justifications that disclosure prevents
corruption, enables the enforcement of other substantive campaign finance
restrictions, and generally informs voters. The Supreme Court has since
narrowed its definition of corruption legitimately subject to campaign
finance regulation and has prohibited enforcement of other substantive
campaign finance restrictions. Therefore, the informational interest has be-
come the most important remaining justification for generally applicable
campaign finance disclosure laws.
A. The Burdens ofDisclosure
Coming more than four decades after Burroughs, Buckley reflected the
intervening development of the First Amendment as a guarantor of minority
rights against majority oppression. Therefore, the primary constitutional
concern about disclosure shifted from the scope of Congressional power to
54 Id. at 657.
55 Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 547 (quoting Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 667).
56 Id. at 548.
57 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 62 (1976) (per curiam); see also id. at 62 n.71. Justice Frankfur-
ter summarized the parallel development of contribution and expenditure limits in his opinion for the
Court in United States v. UA W-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570-84 (1957).
58 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 63-64 (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-434, 438, 441 (Supp. IV 1970)).
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protect the processes of self-government against powerful but narrow cor-
rupting interests, to the scope of individual rights to protect powerless polit-
ical minorities from the government itself.
Although disclosure does not directly restrict speech, the Court in
Buckley observed that "compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously in-
fringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment."' This potential infringement triggered judicial review of the burdens
imposed by disclosure under heightened scrutiny, although, as discussed
below, the precise standard of scrutiny has shifted over time.'
In contrast to how the federal government's efforts to protect civil
rights against corruption and violence in Yarbrough framed the constitu-
tional powers question in Burroughs, a state government's efforts to un-
dermine civil rights in NAACP v. Alabama" framed the constitutional rights
question in Buckley.62 The Court in NAACP considered Alabama's attempt
to oust that organization's local affiliate under state corporate law, and also
considered a state court's order that the affiliate produce its membership list
in the ouster action." It established that "state action which may have
the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest
scrutiny," even when the deterrent effect comes from non-state actors that
receive the disclosed information.' Only a "compelling" state interest could
subordinate the right of association that protects one's ability to engage in
advocacy."5
Buckley cited NAACP for its standard of review, but loosened the strict
"closest scrutiny" standard to the ironically imprecise "exacting scrutiny"
standard. While the standard as stated in Buckley requires more than "a
59 Id, at 64.
60 See Human Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing
confusion, prior to Doe v. Reed, "as to the level of judicial scrutiny applicable to constitutional chal-
lenges to campaign finance disclosure requirements"), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011).
61 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
62 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66.
63 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 451-52.
SId at 460-61.
65 Id. at 463 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)). The Court has since cited exacting scrutiny to require a compelling state interest in other
political speech cases not involving disclosure. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (under "exacting scrutiny," finding a compelling interest in protecting access to
polling places); see also Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420, 428 (1988) (under "exacting scrutiny,"
invalidating prohibition on payment of ballot issue petitioners); First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 786, 795 (1978) (under "exacting scrutiny," finding no compelling interest supported corpo-
rate ballot issue campaign expenditure prohibition).
66 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. The "exacting" standard is an uncommon formulation that first ap-
peared in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("It is
unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exact-
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mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest," it allows for laws
to bear a "substantial relation" to "sufficiently important" interests rather
than insisting on strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring to "compelling" state
interests.6 7 In the contribution and expenditure limit section of the opinion,
the Court describes exacting scrutiny as requiring the laws to be "closely
drawn" to "a sufficiently important interest."" After Buckley, the standard
for contribution and expenditure limits bifurcated, with a "less rigorous,"
"closely drawn" scrutiny applicable to contribution limits,69 and traditional
strict scrutiny applicable to expenditure limits.70 "Exacting scrutiny" ap-
pears only as an implication in McConnell, the most comprehensive consti-
tutional analysis of federal campaign finance law since Buckley, which
upholds disclosure laws simply as meeting "important state interests."7'
The Court returned to "exacting scrutiny" in Citizens United, with the
clarifying reiteration that the standard "requires a 'substantial relation' be-
tween the disclosure requirement and a 'sufficiently important' governmen-
tal interest." 72 Notably, NAACP and its "closest scrutiny" appears nowhere
ing judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation." (emphasis added)).
67 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66 (quoting Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S.
539, 546 (1963)) (second internal quotation marks omitted). While this resembles what the Court has
termed intermediate scrutiny elsewhere, the Court itself does not draw that analogy in other First
Amendment contexts. See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (plurality
opinion) (applying "intermediate scrutiny" to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions by
inquiring "whether [a law] is 'designed to serve a substantial government interest and do [sic] not unrea-
sonably limit alternative avenues of communication' (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986))); cf United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (assessing sex-
based classification for whether it "serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives" (quoting Miss. Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
6' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 44. As Justice Souter later observed an in opinion for the Court: "Pre-
cision about the relative rigor of the standard to review contribution limits was not a pretense of
the Buckley per curiam opinion." Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000). These
inconsistencies reflect the fact that Buckley was drafted on an expedited basis by a five-justice commit-
tee. Justice Stewart authored the contribution and expenditure section and Justice Powell authored the
disclosure section. See Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELEC. L.J.
241, 245 (2003).
69 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003) (second internal quotation marks
omitted), overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also
id. at 231-32 ("When the Government burdens the right to contribute, we apply heightened scruti-
ny.... We ask whether there is a 'sufficiently important interest' and whether the statute is 'closely
drawn' to avoid unnecessary abridgment of First Amendment freedoms." (quoting id. at 136)).
70 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. Even in Citizens United, however, Justice Kennedy sug-
gested an absolute prohibition on "[f]aws that burden political speech," and described strict scrutiny as
only "a sufficient framework for protecting the relevant First Amendment interests in this case." Id.
71 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196.
72 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66) (first internal quotation
marks omitted); see also John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010).
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in the opinion, suggesting that "exacting scrutiny" of disclosure laws has
settled, for now, in the gray area between strict scrutiny and deference un-
der rational basis review. Most recently, the Court refused to treat a public-
matching-funds trigger as another regulation, like disclosure, that deserves
"exacting scrutiny" because it may deter, but does not prevent, campaign
speech. Writing that "[t]his analogy is not even close,"" the Court missed
an opportunity to clarify the doctrinal basis for a standard of scrutiny that
apparently applies only to disclosure.74 When applied, it has validated most
campaign disclosure laws on their face, as in Buckley, Citizens United, and
Doe v. Reed."
In three cases, however, disclosure laws failed the exacting scrutiny
standard." In these cases the Court did not question the importance of the
State's interests in disclosure generally, but held that the laws at issue did
not substantially advance those interests. In Buckley v. American Constitu-
tional Law Foundation, Inc., the disclosure law at issue overlapped with
other effective disclosure laws, and therefore, was "no more than tenuously
related to the substantial interests disclosure serves."" In Davis v. Federal
Election Commission," the disclosure law served only to implement the
increased contribution limits for opponents to self-funded candidates under
the "Millionaire's Amendment," which the Court already had invalidated."o
The third case, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission," is addressed in
the next Section.
Disclosure imposes two kinds of burdens recognized by the Court. The
original concern underlying heightened scrutiny of disclosure requirements
is the mandated identification of the speaker or, in the case of an associa-
tion, its members. Developed in NAACP and subsequent cases involving
groups historically subject to political oppression, the identification burden
is grounds for exemption from a broad range of public disclosure laws, in-
cluding but not limited to, campaign finance disclosure. More recently, the
Court has recognized an organizational burden imposed by administrative
requirements intended to make disclosure more effective under campaign
finance law reforms.
73 See Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2822 (2011).
74 See id at 2837-38 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 18; see also Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304, 315 (8th Cir.
2011) (applying exacting scrutiny to disclosure requirements), reh'g en banc granted, (July 12, 2011).
76 Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law
Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 204 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
77 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
78 Id. at 204.
79 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
80 Id. at 729, 744 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
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1. The Burden of Identification
As the Court recognized in NAACP, disclosure can chill an associa-
tion's "collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the
right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from the As-
sociation and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of
their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of
this exposure."82 In Buckley, however, minor parties and independents
failed to win an exemption to disclosure requirements." The interests in
disclosure overrode the fact they "usually represent definite and publicized
viewpoints" that already were disclosed by a minor party's title or an inde-
pendent candidate's positions and were "more vulnerable to falloffs in con-
tributions."' Given the fact-specific nature of the inquiry into the identifi-
cation burden, no clear line can be drawn at the point at which a "disclosure
will impinge upon protected associational activity.""
The difference between the Libertarian Party, a plaintiff in Buckley,
and the plaintiff in NAACP was uncontroverted evidence that for the
NAACP, "revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members [had] ex-
posed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of
physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility."86 Minor
parties could bring an as-applied challenge showing "a reasonable probabil-
ity that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will sub-
ject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government offi-
cials or private parties."87 The Socialist Workers Party brought such a chal-
lenge on behalf of its sixty members in Ohio, leaving little doubt that it
qualified for anonymity on account of past harassment by government offi-
cials and private parties." Unanimously, the Supreme Court held that the
82 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,463 (1958).
83 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam).
84Id. at 70-71.
85 Id. at 73.
86 Id. at 69 (alteration in original) (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
87 Id. at 74.
88 Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982).
Appellees introduced proof of specific incidents of private and government hostility toward
the SWP and its members within the four years preceding the trial. These incidents, many of
which occurred in Ohio and neighboring States, included threatening phone calls and hate
mail, the burning of SWP literature, the destruction of SWP members' property, police ha-
rassment of a party candidate, and the firing of shots at an SWP office. There was also evi-
dence that in the 12-month period before trial 22 SWP members, including 4 in Ohio, were
fired because of their party membership. Although appellants contend that two of the Ohio
firings were not politically motivated, the evidence amply supports the District Court's con-
clusion that "private hostility and harassment toward SWP members make it difficult for
them to maintain employment.
Id. at 99. The FBI also conducted surveillance of and interfered with the Party's activities, including
"the dissemination of information designed to impair the ability of the SWP and YSA to function." Id.
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disclosure exemption applied to the party and enjoined enforcement of the
state candidate campaign expense reporting law. However, only five justic-
es joined in extending the exemption beyond members and contributors to
recipients of its expenditures."
Such successful as-applied challenges are rare due to the burden of
proof required for associational anonymity. In the 2008 California Proposi-
tion 8 campaign to prohibit same-sex marriage, a federal court denied a
preliminary injunction against disclosure of contributors of $100 or more to
campaign committees supporting the ballot issue." Despite evidence of
threats, harassment, and "random acts of violence directed at a very small
segment of the supporters of the initiative" in the midst of "the heat of an
election battle," the court held the disclosure exemption would likely not
apply "to groups that were successful at the polls, that have evidenced a
very minimal effect on their ability to sustain their movement, and that are
unable to produce evidence of pervasive animosity even remotely reaching
the level of that was present in Brown."' One recent survey of similar
claims found that, beyond the Communist and Socialist Parties themselves
and the historical harassment of the NAACP and similar groups during the
civil rights era, "the degree of harm caused by the retaliation is uncertain
and may be relatively low.""
Where a disclosure law sacrifices individual anonymity at extremely
low levels of political activity-lower even than a minor party at the fringe
of state politics-it may be subject to facial invalidation under "exacting
scrutiny" without any showing of retaliation. In the classic case, Margaret
McIntyre composed, printed, and distributed leaflets opposing a proposed
school tax levy, signed "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX
PAYERS."94 In response to a school official's complaint, Ohio found Mrs.
McIntyre in violation of the campaign disclaimer requirement and fined her
$100.11
89 Id at 98.
90 ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1219 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
91 Id. at 1217. Justice Thomas referenced some of these threats in his Citizens United dissent. See
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 980-81 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
92 ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1214; see also Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 666
F. Supp. 2d 193, 206 n.74 (D. Me. 2009) (observing that in challenge to disclosure of contributors to
similar ballot issue campaign, plaintiffs "have not claimed that disclosure would subject their contribu-
tors to danger or harassment, nor is there a record here indicating a pattern of threats or specific manife-
stations of public hostility towards them or showing that individuals or organizations holding similar
views have been threatened or harmed"), affd in part, vacated in part, 649 F.3d 34 (2011).
93 Mayer, supra note 15, at 275.
94 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 337 (1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
95 Id at 3 38.
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Rejecting the informational interest "in the case of a handbill written
by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient," when "the name and
address of the author add little, if anything, to the reader's ability to eva-
luate the document's message," the Supreme Court invalidated the law on
its face.' The Buckley Court's approval of independent expenditure disclo-
sure at a level as low as $100 dollars "is a far cry from compelled self-
identification on all election-related writings," which "reveals unmistaka-
bly" the speaker's "thoughts on a controversial issue," and is more "likely
to precipitate retaliation.""7 For similar reasons, the Court later invalidated
laws requiring paid ballot issue petitioners to wear name badges and be
identified in campaign finance filings." Both decisions provide the extraor-
dinary remedy of facial invalidation when the disclosure law's breadth
sweeps in unorganized individuals who in most cases, unlike a minor party
or ballot issue campaign, will lack the resources to bring as-applied chal-
lenges when there may be a risk of retaliation.
McIntyre also prompted a lengthy historical debate about the role of
anonymous political speech in the Founding Era. Justice Thomas, noting
that "only two major Federalist or Anti-Federalist pieces appear to have
been signed by their true authors,"" claimed the Framers "believed that the
freedom of the press included the right to publish without revealing the
author's name."" Due to the nature of disseminating anonymous writing,
most of the examples Justice Thomas cited concerned newspapers and other
publishers."' Justice Scalia, conceding that "[t]he question posed by the
present case is not the easiest sort to answer for those who adhere" to origi-
nalism,'02 deferred to "the widespread and longstanding traditions of our
people" as incorporated into the disclosure laws of nearly every state.'
Anonymous speech was "at the periphery of the First Amendment," accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, and need not be allowed absent proof of probable re-
taliation. "
These debates continue in the Court's most recent disclosure case, Doe
v. Reed.10 In a case that seemed to present low-level political activity (bal-
lot issue petition signing) similar to the leafleteer and petitioner anonymity
96 Id. at 348-49.
97 Id at 355.
98 Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 192, 197-204 (1999).
9 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 368 (Thomas, J., concurring).
100 Id at 367. Justice Thomas also conceded that "there is no evidence that, after the adoption of
the First Amendment, the Federal Government attempted to require writers to attach their names to
political documents," or "that the federal courts of the early Republic would have squashed such an
effort as a violation of the First Amendment." Id
t0' See id. at 360-66.
102 Id. at 371-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 375, 376 n.2.
104 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 378, 385.
105 John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
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cases, the Court rejected a facial challenge to Washington's public disclo-
sure law to the extent it required disclosure of ballot issue petition signa-
tures. Applying "exacting scrutiny," the Court held that "the State's interest
in preserving electoral integrity" against fraud and mistake outweighed the
"only modest burdens [that] attend the disclosure of a typical petition.""
The "electoral integrity" interest did not include an informational interest,
but embraced a possibly related interest in "promoting transparency and
accountability in the electoral process."'o7
The "typical petition" is an important qualification to the holding,
however, because the Court acknowledged the potential for retaliation
against supporters of controversial issues through new media such as inter-
net searchable databases and maps.' The same plaintiffs brought a separate
as-applied challenge, presenting evidence of retaliation from the Proposi-
tion 8 disclosure case, that Justice Alito in concurrence called "a strong
argument" for an as-applied exemption to disclosure.'" Justice Thomas
would not have waited for an as-applied challenge, citing "[s]ignificant
practical problems" in the timing of such challenges after a proponent must
decide whether to launch a petition campaign and after a voter must decide
whether to sign a petition, all without knowing whether particular petition
would meet the threshold for an as-applied challenge."o
Justice Scalia again responded with a strong critique of political ano-
nymity. "[H]arsh criticism, short of unlawful action, is a price our people
have traditionally been willing to pay for self-governance. Requiring people
to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without
which democracy is doomed.""' No other members of the Court were as
categorical as Justice Thomas (and likely Justice Alito) in his opposition to
disclosure or Justice Scalia in his opposition to anonymity. As Justice Gins-
burg wrote in her McIntyre concurrence, the Court leaves open the question
of whether or not a law may "in other, larger circumstances require the
106 Id.at2819,2821.
107 id. at 2819.
108 Id. at 2820; see also id. at 2825 (Alito, J., concurring) ("If this information is posted on the
Internet, then anyone with access to a computer could compile a wealth of information about all of those
persons, including in many cases all of the following: the names of their spouses and neighbors, their
telephone numbers, directions to their homes, pictures of their homes, information about their homes
(such as size, type of construction, purchase price, and mortgage amount), information about any motor
vehicles that they own, any court case in which they were parties, any information posted on a social
networking site, and newspaper articles in which their names appeared (including such things as wed-
ding announcements, obituaries, and articles in local papers about their children's school and athletic
activities). The potential that such information could be used for harassment is vast.").
109 Id. at 2823. As Justice Alito noted, the Court cited evidence from the Proposition 8 campaign in
its order staying the broadcast of the trial of the constitutional challenge to that ballot issue, but such
evidence did not bear on the Court's procedural grounds for the stay. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S.
Ct. 705, 712-13 (2010).
110 Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2844 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Ill Id. at 2837 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity."ll 2 In future cases
the record of a potential chilling of political speech, and the importance of
countervailing state interests, will determine where the rest of the Court
stands on the extent of the identification burden.
2. The Burden of Organization
Although anonymity is the original doctrinal principle opposed to dis-
closure, the more practical issue of organizational rules is likely to play at
least as important a role in determining the constitutionality of new disclo-
sure rules going forward. Organizational rules are a method of designating a
political actor as subject to a particular set of campaign finance laws."' In
the original Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, at issue in Burroughs,
the political actor subject to the law was the "political committee" defined
as "any committee, association, or organization which accepts contributions
or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influ-
ence the election of candidates or presidential and vice presidential elec-
tors."" 4 As political activity has grown more complex, the political actor
designations have proliferated at the federal level."' Notably, in both state
and federal law the basic definition is common. 16
The burden of organizational rules is an administrative burden, be-
cause disclosure requires a political actor to determine its designation and
file campaign finance reports consistent with that designation. For a candi-
date, the designation is clear and the reports are necessary for the cam-
paign's accountability to the public for the contributions it receives. The
organizational rules require a political committee to register, name a trea-
surer, and keep financial records of contributions and expenditures. "' Polit-
ical committees then must report contributions and expenditures on a sche-
dule based on the dates of the election."' The central organizational rule for
a political committee fulfills the primary function of campaign finance dis-
closure: identification of contributors whose donations reach a certain thre-
112 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 358 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
113 E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-201 to -208 (2011).
114 Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 540 n.* (1934) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 241(c) (1934)).
115 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2006) ("political committee"); id. § 431(5) ("principal campaign
committee"); id. § 431(6) ("authorized committee"); id. § 431(7) ("connected organization"); id. §
431(14) ("national committee"); id § 431(15) ("State committee"); 2 U.S.C. § 431(16) ("political par-
ty").
116 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-101(22) ("'Political committee' means a combination of
two or more individuals or a person other than an individual who makes a contribution or expendi-
ture ... to support or oppose a candidate or a committee organized to support or oppose a candidate or a
petition for nomination. . . .").
117 See, e.g., 2. U.S.C. §§ 432-433; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-201 to -208.
118 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434; MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-226.
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shold."' Each of the other organizational rules supports the disclosure func-
tion through accountability measures such as a treasurer, recordkeeping,
and timely reporting.
A constitutional issue arises when these or similar organizational rules
apply to political actors that have not obviously opted into them by declar-
ing a candidacy or formally establishing a political committee. For exam-
ple, a person triggers disclosure requirements by making an "expenditure"
over a certain threshold, which includes a "gift of money or anything of
value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election.""2
That definition commonly includes exemptions for volunteer activity, me-
dia broadcasts or publications, or communications within a membership
organization, 2 ' but still could apply to a wide range of political advocacy.
The point of a broad "influencing any election" definition, Buckley ex-
plains, is to reach "'every kind of political activity,' in order to insure that
the voters are fully informed and to achieve through publicity the maximum
deterrence to corruption and undue influence possible," as well as to cap-
ture efforts to evade the law "by routing financial support of candidates
through avenues not explicitly covered by the general provisions of the
Act."122
To avoid vagueness in the application of independent expenditure laws
to advocacy groups uninvolved in campaigns, Buckley narrowed the disclo-
sure trigger in two ways. First, the Court narrowed the political committee
organizational rules to "only encompass organizations that are under the
control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or
election of a candidate." 23 An organization with "the major purpose" of
campaigning should be on notice that the full organizational rules of politi-
cal committee status apply to it. For other organizations, disclosure must be
obtained "in a manner less restrictive than imposing the full panoply of
regulations that accompany status as a political committee." 24
Second, the Court limited the definition of "expenditure" for all politi-
cal actors to cover "only funds used for communications that expressly ad-
vocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."' 25 Again,
political actors would know disclosure was triggered by "spending that is
119 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (setting a $200 threshold); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-
229(2) (establishing a $35 threshold).
120 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A) (first internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 13-1-101(11)(a).
121 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-101(11)(b).
122 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 76 (1976) (per curiam) (footnote omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO.
92-229, at 57 (1971)).
123 Id. at 79.
124 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
125 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80 (footnote omitted) (first internal quotation marks omitted).
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unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate."l 26
Similarly, a more specific definition of an "electioneering communication"
clearly identifying a candidate that is broadcast before an election also
would be sufficiently definite for disclosure purposes.127 So construed, dis-
closure laws function as "a reasonable and minimally restrictive method of
furthering First Amendment values by opening the basic processes of our
federal election system to public view." 28
These constructions did not fully resolve the organizational burden is-
sue, however. Effective disclosure laws may require an organization to
name a treasurer, keep records, and regularly report even when it does not
meet the "major purpose" threshold for a political committee. In Federal
Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,'29 the Su-
preme Court exempted an advocacy group from political committee organi-
zational rules that applied solely by virtue of the group's incorporation,
leaving it subject only to the background independent expenditure disclo-
sure rules.'30 The Court criticized "additional regulations [that] may create a
disincentive for such organizations to engage in political speech," including
some of the registration and reporting duties under both political committee
and simple independent expenditure disclosure laws, which "impose admin-
istrative costs that many small entities may be unable to bear."'"' Justice
O'Connor saw potential for misapplication of the holding and did not lend
her crucial fifth vote in concurrence to that part of the opinion.'32 She clari-
fied that "the significant burden on [Massachusetts Citizens for Life] in this
case comes not from the disclosure requirements that it must satisfy, but
from the additional organizational restraints imposed upon it by the Act.""'
The main organizational restraint was not the registration and reporting
duties, but a requirement that as a nonprofit corporation it must raise and
spend its political campaign funds exclusively through a separate political
committee; the same requirement that Citizens United invalidated for all
corporations.
Notwithstanding this clarification, lower courts have struggled to draw
the "major purpose" line and have confused the organizational burdens of
federal-style political committees with the registration and reporting duties
incident to disclosure laws at the state level. Rather than assessing the par-
126 id
127 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 193-94 (2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (reviewing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2000)), overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915.
128 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82.
129 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (plurality opinion).
130 See id. at 262-63.
13 Id. at 254.
132 Id at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (comparing id. at 254-55 (majority opinion), with
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81-82).
133 Id at 266.
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ticular organizational burdens imposed by a given disclosure law, as the
Supreme Court did in Buckley and Massachusetts Citizens, some courts
have presumed that any designation of political committee status for organ-
izations that do not meet the "major purpose" test is unconstitutional.'"
They have reached this holding even when the law does not impose a par-
ticular organizational form, as in Massachusetts Citizens, but only serves as
a vehicle for disclosure through the registration and reporting requirements
the Court endorsed.' This broad-brushed approach obscures an important
question raised, but not answered, in Buckley as to whether the political
committee requirement of disclosing the identity of the organization's con-
tributors, in addition to its campaign expenditures, generally imposes a re-
levant burden on political speech.
B. The Benefits ofDisclosure
Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has recognized three interests suffi-
cient to justify disclosure laws: "[P]roviding the electorate with informa-
tion, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and
gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering
restrictions."' 36 After Citizens United, the viability of the latter two interests
in support of disclosure is in doubt.
1. The Informational Interest
The informational interest in disclosure is currently seen as a kind of
inoculation against free speech in campaigns. Justice Kennedy's formula-
tion for the Court in Citizens United set disclosure and free speech against
each other: "The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure
permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities
in a proper way."' On this view, free speech is a constitutionally protected
given for the speaker, while disclosure is closer to the level of a policy
choice to permit citizens to know who is speaking. What is or is not the
"proper way" of reacting to a speaker's identity is left to later definition. At
the extreme in McIntyre, the informational interest "means nothing more
than the provision of additional information that may either buttress or un-
dermine the argument in a document," and so understood "the identity of
134 See infra Part Ill.B.
135 See Mayer, supra note 15, at 271 ("Whether such administrative burdens are constitutionally
significant is also unclear.") (comparing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897-
98 (2010), with Mass. Citizens, 479 U.S. at 252-56).
136 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
137 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
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the speaker is no different from other components of the document's con-
tent that the author is free to include or exclude."' 3 ' As Justice Thomas
pointed out in his McConnell dissent, the most basic formulation of the
informational interest appears to contradict the holding in McIntyre that
"[t]he simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant informa-
tion does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or
disclosures she would otherwise omit,"" which in his view "overturned
Buckley to the extent that Buckley upheld a disclosure requirement solely
based on the governmental interest in providing information to the vot-
ers." 1This "simple" informational interest may be insufficiently important
to meet exacting scrutiny for disclosure laws under the First Amendment.
It was not always so. Buckley opened with an expressly republican in-
vocation of the First Amendment's purpose: "In a republic where the
people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices
among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are
elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation." 4' Dis-
closure promotes speech because it "increases the fund of information con-
cerning those who support the candidates," by helping "voters to define
more of the candidates' constituencies."' 4 2 Later, Buckley upheld public
financing of presidential campaigns as furthering "pertinent First Amend-
ment values" by facilitating "public discussion and participation in the elec-
toral process, goals vital to a self-governing people."'43 The central purpose
of the First Amendment, the Court noted, citing New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan," "was to assure a society in which 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open' public debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for
only in such a society can a healthy representative democracy flourish." 4 S
The lower court in McConnell, in a passage adopted by the Supreme
Court, called "nothing short of surprising" those plaintiffs' reliance on that
same First Amendment principle in their attack on disclosure laws." Not-
ing that the plaintiffs' intent was "to preserve the ability to run [electioneer-
ing] advertisements while hiding behind dubious and misleading names,"
138 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995).
139 id
140 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 276 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam).
142 Id. at 81; see also First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978) ("[T]he
people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative
merits of conflicting arguments. They may consider, in making their judgment, the source and credibili-
ty of the advocate." (footnote omitted)).
143 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92-93.
144 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
145 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93 n.127 (quoting N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270).
146 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (quoting McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003) (per curiam)), overruled in part by Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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the court asked "how 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' speech can occur
when organizations hide themselves from the scrutiny of the voting pub-
lic."1 47 On this view, not only would invalidation of disclosure laws not
reinforce "the precious First Amendment values that Plaintiffs argue are
trampled," but it would also "ignore[] the competing First Amendment in-
terests of individual citizens seeking to make informed choices in the politi-
cal marketplace.""' Justice Breyer summarized this dynamic elsewhere
with his observation that "constitutionally protected interests lie on both
sides of the legal equation" in campaign finance cases, because the laws at
issue "encourag[e] the public participation and open discussion that the
First Amendment itself presupposes."'49
This constitutionally balanced conception of the informational interest,
with freedom of speech values on both sides of the disclosure analysis, can
be traced back through pre-Buckley campaign finance cases. In United
States v. International Union United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural
Implement Workers ofAmerica (UA W-CIO),'" which avoided the corporate
speech question answered in Citizens United, Justice Frankfurter included
the early publicity laws in a list of laws that continued "to sustain the ac-
tive, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the
wise conduct of government.""' Three years earlier in United States v. Har-
riss,'52 the Court linked a lobbying disclosure law to "full realization of the
American ideal of government by elected representatives," because it
helped to identify "special interest groups seeking favored treatment while
masquerading as proponents of the public weal.... who is being hired, who
is putting up the money, and how much."' Harriss, in turn, cited Bur-
roughs, which originally linked disclosure to the "vital particular" of the
power of self-government.'54
This republican principle of facilitating self-government does not ap-
pear in Citizens United's discussion of the informational interest. Else-
where, the Court cites a dissent to Automobile Workers and abandons that
case's broader analysis as a "flawed historical account of campaign finance
laws."' It nods to "transparency" that "enables the electorate to make in-
formed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messag-
147 Id. at 197 (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 237).
148 Id. (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 237).
149 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400-01 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
150 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
151 Id. at 575.
152 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
153 Id. at 625.
154 Id. (citing Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) ("To say that Congress is
without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper use of
money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self-protection.")).
155 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 901, 912 (2010) (citing UAW-CIO,
352 U.S. at 593, 597 (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
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es,""'6 but does not root it in any fundamental American ideal of govern-
ment. By the time the Court addressed disclosure in Doe v. Reed, the idea
of "transparency" had become malleable enough to become a component of
"the integrity of the electoral process" and distinguishable from "the State's
'informational' interest."' By casting that interest as less than constitution-
al, the Court deemphasized the power of disclosure to facilitate self-
government. "Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy," yet accord-
ing to the Citizens United Court, the First Amendment's role in that me-
chanism now is "[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power" rather
than helping to constitute government itself.' The First Amendment's li-
bertarian command thus eclipses its republican purpose.
2. The Anticorruption Interest
The republican strand of the state interest in disclosure, now
represented by the weak, current form of the informational interest, might
be reinforced and extended with the anticorruption interest in disclosure.
Buckley suggests how the constitutional law of disclosure might retrace its
steps to the origins of modern campaign finance doctrine and take an alter-
nate path guided by a more complete understanding of the First Amend-
ment. Explaining how "the light of publicity. . . . may discourage those
who would use money for improper purposes either before or after the elec-
tion," Buckley invokes both Brandeis and Burroughs in its statement of the
anticorruption interest.'59
In a footnote to this passage the Court goes further, citing the seminal
media case of Grosjean v. American Press Co.'" to suggest how disclosure
protects First Amendment values through the work of the free press.
"[I]nformed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgo-
vernment,"' 6' Buckley explains, quoting Grosjean, in a republican counter-
point to the libertarian view of the First Amendment as "[p]remised on mi-
strust of governmental power" in Citizens United.62 "A free press stands as
one of the great interpreters between the government and the people," Gros-
156 Id. at 916.
157 John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2819 (2010).
158 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per
curiam)).
159 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67 (footnote omitted) (citing Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 548, and LOUIs D.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933)).
160 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
161 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67 n.79 (quoting Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
162 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. Citizens United cited Grosjean too, but it did so in a citation
to the First Amendment rights of corporations in the context of political speech. Id. at 900 (citing Gros-
jean, 297 U.S. at 244).
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jean continues, and given its role in facilitating good government, "the sup-
pression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be
regarded otherwise than with grave concern."" From this republican stand-
point, the purposes of disclosure and the First Amendment are allied, and an
alternative view that suppresses disclosure under the First Amendment also
risks suppressing the gravely important work of a free press.
By incorporating these republican ideas into the basis for a broad anti-
corruption interest, Buckley grounded campaign finance disclosure in what
the Court at the time recognized were "interests of the highest impor-
tance."" Recognizing that "laws making criminal the giving and taking of
bribes deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with
money to influence governmental action,"' the corruption interest ex-
tended not only to quid pro quo agreements, but also to a subtler form of
"undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of
such influence."'" This broad statement of the anticorruption interest not
only approached the role of money in politics with modest doubt about the
possibility that criminal laws could themselves resolve the problem of un-
due influence, but also suggested that voters rather than legislators or crim-
inal juries may be the better judge of what influence is "undue" when re-
cognizing "the appearance of such influence." Disclosure thus delegates the
question of what appears corrupt to the people themselves, and thus away
from legislatures and courts. As Professor Kathleen Sullivan explains, dis-
closure "places the question of undue influence or preferential access in the
hands of voters, who, aided by the institutional press, can follow the money
and hold representatives accountable for any trails they don't like.""' This
avoids the practical problem Professor David Strauss identifies of legally
defining and enforcing the difficult distinction "between interest group poli-
tics and the effort to promote some version of the public good."' 8
The Court recently articulated a definition of corruption that includes
Buckley's concern about undue influence in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal
Co.'" In that case, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court held that spend-
ing in a judicial campaign by a party interested in a case, including inde-
pendent expenditures that by definition did not constitute a quid pro quo
163 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250.
164 First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at
26-27).
165 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28.
166 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001).
167 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 326
(1998).
168 See David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1369, 1378 (1994); see also Sullivan, supra note 167, at 326 ("[Disclosure] enlists government in
a recordkeeping and reporting task that entails no danger of partisan bias or discretionary content re-
view.").
169 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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agreement, violated an opposing litigant's due process rights when that
spending has "a significant and disproportionate influence on the electoral
outcome" for one of the judges. 10 Again, the Court showed modesty about
drawing bright judicial lines between corruption and integrity when it stated
that "proving what ultimately drives the electorate to choose a particular
candidate is a difficult endeavor, not likely to lend itself to a certain conclu-
sion," even when undue influence is only perceived and not proven."
Citizens United rejects the "undue influence" view, and deemphasizes
the anticorruption interest in general, by recasting Buckley's "sufficiently
important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance
of corruption" as "limited to quid pro quo corruption."'72 Under the same
pen of Justice Kennedy, the Court adopted something closer to the dissent's
reasoning in Caperton that the absence of a "judicially discernible and ma-
nageable standard"'73 for undue influence-memorably explored in Chief
Justice Roberts's forty questions-means no meaningful anticorruption
lines can be drawn beyond bribery and extortion. 74 In the Court's narrowed
view of the anticorruption interest, there is no middle ground between quid
pro quo corruption and mere "[i]ngratiation and access.""' Though "surely
there is cause for concern" when "elected officials succumb to improper
influences" or otherwise "surrender their best judgment" or "put expedien-
cy before principle" due to campaign spending, these are no longer consti-
tutionally compelling concerns about corruption."' On this strict view, cor-
ruption becomes a purely legal, exclusively criminal problem for the courts
and not a political problem for citizens.
As far as disclosure is concerned, Buckley described the anticorruption
interest as "discourag[ing] those who would use money for improper pur-
poses either before or after the election" because the public would be
170 Id. at 2264.
171 id
172 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010).
173 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 306 (2004) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Citizens United, Justice
Kennedy quoted his own similar conclusion in his McConnell dissent that "[r]eliance on a 'generic
favoritism or influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First Amendment analyses because it is
unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle."' Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (second altera-
tion in original) (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 296 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting in part), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876).
174 Cf Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010) (in vagueness challenge, construing
criminal prohibition against fraudulent deprivations of "the intangible right of honest services" to cover
"only bribery and kickback schemes" (quoting 18 U.S.C § 1346 (2006)) (first internal quotation marks
omitted)).
175 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910-11.
176 See id. at 911; see also SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C.
Cir.) (reviewing the ebb and flow of the Court's definition of corruption), cert. denied sub nom. Keating
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010).
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"armed with information" from campaign finance disclosure."' Yet if "im-
proper purposes" means no more than quid pro quo corruption that is al-
ready criminal under bribery and extortion laws, then any justification for
disclosure under the narrowed anticorruption interest relies on the unrealis-
tic premise that political actors will comply with disclosure laws that may
help establish what could be violations of criminal corruption laws. And if
"improper purposes," or "undue influence" broadly, means more than what
the Supreme Court now means by "anticorruption," then disclosure of these
improprieties can be justified only by something else, like the informational
interest. Not surprisingly, after reducing the scope of the anticorruption
interest in its discussion of corporate campaign expenditures, Citizens Unit-
ed relies solely on the informational interest in its discussion of independent
expenditure disclosure. It does not mention corruption or even undue influ-
ence.178
3. The Enforcement Interest
The reduction of permissible limits on campaign spending also has re-
duced the scope of the interest in disclosure as a means to detect violations
of those limits. Buckley itself described disclosure, and associated record-
keeping and reporting requirements, as essential to detecting violations of
the contribution limits it had upheld.'17 Later cases suggested other restric-
tions that prevented the circumvention of those contribution limits. Presum-
ably disclosure related to those ancillary restrictions also could be justi-
fied.'o Citizens United, however, took circumvention as an inevitable re-
sponse to campaign finance laws rather than as an interest sufficient to jus-
tify them."' Beyond its invalidation of restrictions on corporate campaign
expenditures, the rationale, if not the holding, of Citizens United calls into
question the justification for remaining limits, including foreign campaign
spending restrictions and even contribution limits.'82
177 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam).
1 But see Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2827 (2011)
(implying that "strict disclosure requirements," with "ascetic contribution limits" and "the general
availability of public funding" might provide more "marginal corruption deterrence" than a public
matching funds trigger).
179 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68.
180 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. 876; see also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533
U.S. 431,456 (2001).
181 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912 ("Political speech is so ingrained in our culture that
speakers find ways to circumvent campaign finance laws. Our Nation's speech dynamic is changing,
and informative voices should not have to circumvent onerous restrictions to exercise their First
Amendment rights." (citation omitted)).
182 See id. at 911-13.
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In ruling that corporate campaign expenditures are constitutionally
protected, the Supreme Court in Citizens United found "no basis for the
proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may
impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.""' This would seem to
apply as well to restrictions on campaign spending funded by foreign na-
tionals. Although the Court was careful and correct to say it "need not
reach" that question in Citizens United," it is difficult to conceive of any
distinction between the corporate and foreign campaign spending cases that
would not result in doctrinal incoherence.'85
Even Buckley's central holding as to the constitutionality of contribu-
tion limits received little support in Citizens United. The Court recited this
holding in its narrowing of the anticorruption interest to quid pro quo cor-
ruption, but otherwise avoided discussing the issue because Citizens United
did not ask the Court to "reconsider whether contribution limits should be
subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny."' The remainder of the
opinion, especially the narrowed anticorruption interest, would undermine
rather than reinforce any deference to contribution limits."' As Professor
Richard Hasen has explained, "[i]f access and ingratiation are not corrup-
tion and corruption is really limited to quid pro quo corruption, then contri-
bution limitations would appear to be in serious danger of being struck
down" as unconstitutional, short of further doctrinal incoherence.'
As long as these contribution and foreign expenditure limits stay in
place, the enforcement interest should continue to support disclosure as far
as these limits go. Within this limited scope, Doe v. Reed actually streng-
thens the enforcement interest by holding that disclosure "promotes trans-
parency and accountability in the electoral process to an extent other meas-
ures cannot."' In particular, by acknowledging that "disclosure can help
cure the inadequacies" of enforcement in the petition process, disclosure
should also be "substantially related to the [same] important interest" of
enforcing remaining campaign finance limits.' Like the way disclosure of
petitions delegates to the people the responsibility of guarding against fraud
183 Id at 899.
184 Id at 911.
185 See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581,
606-07 (2011).
186 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
187 See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686, 695 (D.C. Cir.) ("Given this
[narrowing] analysis from Citizens United, we must conclude that the government has no anti-corruption
interest in limiting contributions to an independent expenditure group such as SpeechNow."), cert.
denied sub nom. Keating v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010).
188 Hasen, supra note 185, at 616 (footnote omitted).
189 John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2820 (2010).
190 Id. But see Briffault, supra note 15, at 280-81 (explaining that reporting under campaign
finance laws need not entail public disclosure to serve enforcement interests).
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and mistake, disclosure of campaign spending delegates to the people the
responsibility of detecting corruption or undue influence.
What is left of the enforcement interest also may support ancillary reg-
istration, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements necessary to make dis-
closure itself effective. Aggregation of campaign finance data for public
disclosure in any useful form requires basic information as to who is the
political actor that is speaking (registration), when and how that political
actor is speaking (reporting), and whether the political actor's disclosure is
accurate (recordkeeping). Like the anticorruption interest, however, the
primary effect of narrowing the enforcement interest is to increase the im-
portance of some form of informational interest in justifying disclosure
laws once supported by enforcement of laws that may now lack justification
themselves.
II. DISCLOSURE AND ANTICORRUPTION, RECONCEIVED
As new legal challenges to campaign finance disclosure mount, and
the other interests justifying it weaken, the informational interest must do
more work. The bare "transparency" view of the informational interest de-
scribed in Citizens United, "enabl[ing] the electorate to make informed de-
cisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages,""' may
not be up to the job.
Doctrinally, an "exacting scrutiny" standard that invites repeated re-
consideration of both the means employed and the ends pursued may tend
to weaken such an underdeveloped interest. Before Citizens United, Judge
Posner noted that resolving the constitutionality of any particular disclosure
rule "is difficult because it entails a balancing of imponderables," between
the reduction of campaign speech quantity from funders who "are unwilling
to reveal their identity" on the one hand, and the increase in campaign
speech quality from "additional information useful to the consumer," the
voter, on the other. 92 In the same case, Judge Easterbrook concurred dubi-
tante noting that "the Justices' failure [in McConnell] to discuss McIntyre,
or even to cite Talley, American Constitutional Law Foundation, or Watch-
tower, makes it impossible for courts at our level to make an informed deci-
sion-for the Supreme Court has not told us what principle to apply."'"
While Citizens United answered the particular question of campaign adver-
tising attribution "as applied to the ads" proposed by Citizens United, 94
neither the majority in Citizens United nor in Doe v. Reed addressed these
191 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
192 Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 2004).
193 Id. at 356 (Easterbrook, J., dubitante).
194 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914.
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precedents or proposed a principle that would answer Judge Posner's or
Judge Easterbrook's criticism.
Empirically, a recent review concluded that "the Supreme Court's
simple assertion" about the effectiveness of campaign finance disclosure
after Citizens United "is deeply flawed."' Politically, whatever bipartisan
consensus in favor of campaign finance disclosure may have existed at the
federal level around the time of Buckley and McConnell has dissipated in
the wake of Citizens United, when even modest disclosure reforms have
stalled.'" While these empirical and political dimensions of disclosure are
outside the scope of this Article, they intensify attention on the constitu-
tional dimension of disclosure.
In current constitutional doctrine, disclosure enjoys the status of a na-
tional tradition of good policy subject to, rather than furthering, First
Amendment values. The informational interest contains the faint echo of
Brandeis's commendable publicity, though Buckley cited Brandeis and Bur-
roughs for the anticorruption interest rather than the informational inter-
est.' Decades later, the informational interest in disclosure has progressed
little beyond Buckley's central three-sentence, one-paragraph discussion,'
summarized by McConnell's single phrase "providing the electorate with
information""' and reiterated in a short section at the end of Citizens Unit-
ed.2" These are shallow roots to support what may become the last general-
ly applicable form of campaign finance regulation left standing.
Two steps can deepen the informational interest as the remaining con-
stitutionally cognizable justification for campaign finance disclosure. First,
the informational interest should recognize disclosure as part of the solution
to the problem of factions in Madison's republican theory, which serves as
the foundation for the Constitution and particularly for the First Amend-
ment. Disclosure facilitates the antifactional machinery of the constitutional
system. Thus, we should understand disclosure as furthering the broader
republican constitutional principles underlying the informational interest,
rather than understanding disclosure as merely needing to be excused from
a narrower libertarian reading of the First Amendment alone.
Second, this reconceived informational interest should recognize that
disclosure in its antifactional capacity also serves a core anticorruption
function. While a narrow sense of corruption has prevailed as a matter of
campaign finance restrictions, disclosure still serves to deter corruption in a
195 Mayer, supra note 15, at 270.
196 See generally Samples, supra note 30 (arguing that the DISCLOSE Act would not benefit
voters).
197 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam).
198 Id. at 66-67.
199 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
200 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914-16.
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broader and more historically rooted sense. This broader conception of an-
ticorruption is an end served by the Constitution's antifactional means and
those means include the people's consciousness of faction enabled by dis-
closure. So understood, the informational interest provides a stronger justi-
fication for disclosure as ultimately serving the republican principle of self-
government under the Constitution.
A. Disclosure as Antifactionalism
The informational interest in campaign finance has deeper roots than
the Supreme Court has so far suggested. Once the modem, primarily liber-
tarian view of the First Amendment is set aside, these roots can be traced
back to a broader republican view attributable to the author of the First
Amendment, James Madison himself. The problem of factions in politics,
and the constitutional solution to that problem as elaborated by Madison in
The Federalist No. 10, presupposes an electorate informed about the place
of factions in the republican form of government.20 That problem, and the
function the informational interest plays in its solution, may be more critical
to self-government as other structural checks against faction have become
less effective.
Madison's first entry as "Publius" in The Federalist No. 10 ostensibly
continued Alexander Hamilton's argument for "The Utility of the Union as
a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection."202 Actually, he
changed the subject from maintaining basic civil order to an argument of
201 Professor Cass Sunstein provides a contemporary definition of Madisonian republicanism that
describes the republican principle discussed in this Article. The framers "tried to make a government
that would create [a virtuous] politics without indulging unrealistic assumptions about human nature."
CASS R. SuNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 21 (1993). The resulting Constitution is "a complex
set of precommitment strategies, through which the citizenry creates institutional arrangements to pro-
tect against political self-interest, factionalism, failures in representation, myopia, and other predictable
problems in democratic governance." Id. One court recently provided more Jeffersonian grounds for
disclosure, which may be more ambitious than, but are not inconsistent with, the Madisonian principle.
See Human Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) ("The diffusion of
information and the arraignment of all abuses at the bar of public reason, I deem [one of] the essential
principles of our government . . . ." (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural
Address (Mar. 4, 1801)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011).
202 THE FEDERALIST No.9, supra note 17, at 71 (Alexander Hamilton). There is, to be sure, a facial
inconsistency in relying on a pseudonymous political commentary to support disclosure of campaign
speech. Compared to modern campaign speech, however, Madison's speech as an individual, mediated
through a newspaper's institutionalized editorial judgment, presents a sufficiently different case under
the antifactional interest in disclosure. See infra Parts III.A-B. Justice Scalia has argued, in response to
Justice Thomas's similar point about anonymity in ratification debates and the Founding Era more
generally, that "to prove that anonymous electioneering was used frequently is not to establish that it is a
constitutional right." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 373 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
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political philosophy. 203 The problem was "that our governments are too
unstable," not in terms of recurring insurrection, but "that the public good is
disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often
decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor
party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority"
then in government. 2' The cause was "faction," by which he meant "a
number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion,
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community." 205
The qualification that Madison's concern was majorities "then in gov-
ernment" is important because, as the preceding sentence suggests, the
problem of faction is not the same as the tyrannical potential of popular
majorities. To the contrary, in The Federalist, Madison defined a republic
as "a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from
the great body of the people."2" Therefore the threat to such a government
is not primarily democratic but oligarchic in a factional sense. "It is essen-
tial to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the so-
ciety, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it," Madi-
son explained, "otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their
oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of
republicans and claim for their government the honorable title of repub-
lic."207 Republicanism is so opposed to this oligarchic entrenchment of fac-
tion in government that Madison offers as "the most decisive" proof of the
Constitution's "republican complexion" its "absolute prohibition of the
titles of nobility," as well as the more obvious "express guaranty of the re-
publican form to each of the [State governments]."200
Factions and The Federalist No. 10 play a small but prominent role in
the Supreme Court's approach to the constitutionality of campaign finance
laws. In rejecting limits on corporate independent expenditures in Citizens
United, Justice Kennedy invoked Madison's acknowledgment that
203 Although this argument draws on Madison's understanding of the function of constitutional
law, this is not necessarily an originalist argument. There are doubts that Madison's political philosophy
as expressed in The Federalist No. 10 had significant currency among the constitutional ratification
conventions at the time. See Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REv. 611, 615-16
(1999). Instead, its value is as an important (perhaps the most important) work of political philosophy
from the Founding Era that may be more influential now than it was at the time. See Ian Bartrum, Con-
structing the Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution of Federalist 10, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 9,
19 (2010). Of course, its author also carries an impeccable intellectual pedigree for purposes of constitu-
tional law generally, and First Amendment law in particular.
204 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 17, at 77.
205 Id. at 78.
206 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 17, at 241 (James Madison).
207 Id.
208 Id. at 242; cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; id art. IV, § 4.
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"[fjactions will necessarily form in our Republic" and his concern that "the
remedy of 'destroying the liberty' of some factions is 'worse than the dis-
ease."'20 While corporations present the factional concern that Madison
contemplated, according to the Court, the remedy could not include prohibi-
tion of directly funded corporate speech. "Factions should be checked by
permitting them all to speak, and by entrusting the people to judge what is
true and what is false." 210
The Court's diagnosis of the factional concern implicated in campaign
finance is true as far as it goes, but its description of the remedy is incom-
plete. Madison did write that "it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty,
which is essential to political life," 2 11 but his essay's prescription for politics
integrated liberty with a subtler virtue: republicanism. Given that "the caus-
es of faction cannot be removed" because they are "sown in the nature of
man," Madison's central point is that "[a] republic, by which I mean a gov-
ernment in which the scheme of representation takes place . .. promises the
cure for which we are seeking."2 12
This republican principle for government included, but was not limited
to, "the delegation of the government . . . to a small number of citizens
elected by the rest." 213 In some circumstances "it may well happen that the
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more
consonant to the public good" than in a direct democracy. 214 But, Madison
warned, "the effect may be inverted" because representatives can concen-
trate as well as dissipate factiousness. 215 "Men of factious tempers, of local
prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by
other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the
people." 216
For Madison, then, the republican principle requires something more
than representative government, lest factious representation replace factious
plebiscites. Most notably, Madisonian republicanism requires a scale of
competing interests sufficient to diffuse factions. A large republic, enabled
by representative government, can "take in a greater variety of parties and
interests," and thereby "make it less probable that a majority of the whole
209 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 17, at 78); see also Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 693 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Jefferson and Madison would not have sat at these con-
trols [of corporate campaign expenditures]; but if they did, they would have turned them in the opposite
direction."), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
210 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907 (citation omitted).
211 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 17, at 78.
212 Id. at 79-81.
213 Id. at 82.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id
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will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens." 217 Even if
"such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other. "218
Madison's "scheme of representation" does not only require the hori-
zontal diffusion of the republic across various factions, however. It also
requires the vertical dependence of the representatives on the people, who
as principals must be sufficiently informed about their agents in govern-
ment.219 More than a scale sufficient to support a variety of interests, then,
the republican principle required mechanisms by which self-governing citi-
zens in a republic could recognize the "common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens" that signified faction.2 0 "Be-
sides other impediments," such as federalism and separation of powers, "it
may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonor-
able purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion
to the number whose concurrence is necessary." 21' A similar theme sounds
much later in Madison's embrace of publicly supported education that
"throw[s] that light over the public mind which is the best security against
crafty & dangerous encroachments on the public liberty," in a letter that
more famously declares that "[k]nowledge will forever govern ignorance:
And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves
with the power which knowledge gives."222 As Madison put it in The Fede-
ralist No. 51, "experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions" like the separation of powers, but "[a] dependence on the
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government." 23 Thus, in a
republic, the people remain the ultimate check against faction.
This is where disclosure matters. In general, "extensive republics are
most favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal." 224
Yet even in an extensive republic, Madison understood that the people's
representatives might be "[m]en of factious tempers" rather than those
"whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country."12' Here,
the citizens' consciousness of faction from the disclosure of factious inter-
ests behind campaign speech can impede "the concert and accomplishment
217 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 17, at 83.
218 id
219 Madison himself invokes the language of agency, explaining that "in a republic [the people]
assemble and administer [the government] by their representatives and agents." THE FEDERALIST No.
14, supra note 17, at 100.
220 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 17, at 78.
221 Id. at 83.
222 Letter from James Madison to WT. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in IX THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103, 103, 105 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
223 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 17, at 322 (James Madison).
224 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 17, at 82.
225 id
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of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority."226 In an enlarged
and faction-conscious electorate, "it will be more difficult for unworthy
candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are
too often carried."2 7 For the republican principle to work at the most basic
level of electing representatives to constitute government, disclosure must
unmask faction. The informational interest in disclosure is therefore an in-
terest in disclosing information about interests-factions.
Madison's republican perspective extends to the First Amendment
and, therefore, has an even more direct influence on the constitutionality of
campaign finance disclosure than its role in the Constitution as a whole. As
Professor Akhil Amar notes, our First Amendment was Madison's third,
coming after an original first amendment that would have set a minimum
size for Congress so that representative republicanism was not reduced to
an antidemocratic aristocracy of too few representatives, and an original
second amendment that would have delayed the effect any salary increases
representatives voted for themselves until an election intervened.228 In this
context, the First Amendment "obviously sounds in structure, and focuses
(at least in part) on the representational linkage between Congress and its
constituents."229 Like its structural predecessors, and true to Madison's con-
cerns about "[m]en of factious tempers ... [who] betray the interests of the
people," the "[First] Amendment's historical and structural core was to
safeguard the rights of popular majorities ... against a possibly unrepresen-
tative and self-interested Congress. "230
According to this republican view of the First Amendment, and of the
structure of the Constitution in general, the informational interest should
become stronger as some of Madison's "auxiliary precautions" have be-
come weaker. In modern politics, the weight of deliberation is now borne
more heavily by the people than by political institutions. The vastly in-
creased scope and size of the nation and its federal government, as well as
the nationalization of political debate, has weakened the effectiveness of
federalism as a check by the States. The polarization of political parties has
weakened the parties' mediating role between the electorate and their repre-
sentatives. It also has weakened the separation of powers as a check be-
tween the branches; majority parties are unwilling to check branches of the
226 Id. at 84.
227 Id. at 82.
228 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1137-46
(1991). The original second amendment was ratified in 1992. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVll.
229 Amar, supra note 228, at 1147.
230 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 17, at 82; Amar, supra note 228, at 1147. Madison also
proposed an amendment guaranteeing freedom of the press in the states, presaging the incorporation of
the First Amendment against the States and, according to Madison's own model of republicanism, the
Fourteenth Amendment's increased concern about factions gaining power at the expense of minorities in
the States. See Amar, supra note 228, at 1148-52.
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same party, and minority parties are unable to check branches of the oppo-
site party."'
Making factions more transparent through disclosure is not the ideal
republican solution to the diminution of antifactional "refining and enlarg-
ing" political institutions. Nor is it even Madison's own ideal. With Madi-
son, we might hope to succeed in the republican project simply "by passing
[the public's views] through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary
or partial considerations."232 With some critics of mandatory disclosure, we
might also worry about the quality of public discourse and deliberation un-
der a politics that so explicitly relies on the messenger as much or more
than the message.233 In this respect, however, disclosure even under an anti-
factional interest can also counteract the coarseness that anonymity encou-
rages. "The principal impediment" against "innuendo, or demeaning cha-
racterization, or mere disclosure of items of personal life that have no bear-
ing upon suitability for office," Justice Scalia observed in McIntyre, "is the
reluctance of most individuals and organizations to be publicly associated
with uncharitable and uncivil expression."234
Yet as The Federalist attests, Madison's version of republicanism
takes the world as it is. "If men were angels no government would be ne-
cessary."235 Therefore, it is fair to call Madisonian the insight that "the de-
sign of governmental institutions matters greatly in our second-best
world."236 A world in which the First Amendment's application to political
speech was premised on a libertarian ideal alone might distort constitutional
free speech values more than one in which the First Amendment's absolute
"make no law" command was balanced by respect for its republican pur-
pose.2'7 Campaign finance disclosure may inhibit and, to some minds ab-
231 See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes ofHyperpolarized Democ-
racy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 273, 324-33 (2011) (explaining the circumstances and consequences
of extreme polarization).
232 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 17, at 82.
233 See Smith, supra note 28, at 78 ("The decline in the quality of our civic discourse can't be
dumped entirely at the foot of mandatory disclosure, of course. But laws that regard the identity of
speakers as fundamental to the public's ability to judge arguments may well exacerbate a thoughtless,
partisan, nasty brand of political debate."). For a discussion of whether disclosure does more harm than
good to democratic deliberation, see generally Samples, supra note 30.
234 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 382-83 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 17, at 322.
236 Frank H. Easterbrook, The State ofMadison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1329-30 (1994).
237 This approach draws on Professor Adrian Vermeule's "second-best constitutionalism":
Stated abstractly, suppose that at least some of the conditions necessary to produce a given
ideal or first-best constitutional order fail to hold. Even if it would be best to achieve full sa-
tisfaction of all those conditions, it does not follow that it is best to achieve as many of the
conditions as possible, taken one by one. Rather, multiple failures of the ideal can offset one
another, producing a closer approximation to the ideal at the level of the overall system.
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ridge, the freedom of speech.238 Yet it also serves the freedom of speech by
unmasking the self-interested factions at which the First Amendment (at
least in part) is aimed.23 9 Even leading critics of disclosure, who base their
antidisclosure arguments on an optimistic view of deliberative democracy,
generally embrace Madison's more realistic approach to factions once out-
side of the campaign finance context.240 Viewed this way, the informational
interest is integral to, not opposed to, the freedom of speech in the cam-
paign finance disclosure context. In Madison's terms, disclosure enables the
citizens' consciousness of, and opposition to, "the secret wishes of an un-
just and interested majority."24 ' An application of the First Amendment that
fails to take account of, or is hostile to, the informational interest so unders-
tood is substantially and constitutionally incomplete.
B. Antifactionalism as Anticorruption
A deeper, constitutionally rooted informational interest suggests a re-
configuration of Buckley's original justifications for disclosure. In particu-
lar, it revives and relies upon a more meaningful form of the anticorruption
interest. What is left of the anticorruption interest-actually, what is left out
of the Court's newly narrowed quid pro quo definition of corruption 242-
might be salvaged to strengthen further the informational interest. Together,
a revitalized informational interest combined with elements from a revised
form of an anticorruption interest can shape a deeper, stronger set of anti-
factional values motivating disclosure.
This is a semantic argument and an important one. "Corruption" is a
loaded term in First Amendment analysis of campaign finance law. The
difference between the results in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (2009).
238 See supra Part 1.A.
239 Justice Kagan recently expressed a republican view of the First Amendment, criticizing a read-
ing of the First Amendment that did not acknowledge a public campaign funding law's purpose "to
break the stranglehold of special interests on elected officials." See Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom
Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2830 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). Such a reading, she ex-
plained, missed the Court's past recognition that such a law "promotes the values underlying both the
First Amendment and our entire Constitution by enhancing the 'opportunity for free political discussion
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people."' Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
240 Compare Samples, supra note 30, at 7 (discussing how disclosure may negatively affect deli-
berative democracy), with JOHN SAMPLES, THE STRUGGLE TO LIMrr GOVERNMENT: A MODERN
POLIrICAL HISTORY 252 (2010) ("[G]overnment does not internalize its costs and benefits. Instead, it
offers benefits to the many at a cost to the few (majoritarian abuse of power) or benefits to the few at a
cost to many (special-interest politics).").
241 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 17, at 84.
242 See supra Part 1.B.2.
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Commerce243 and Citizens United, for example, is almost entirely a differ-
ence in what the Supreme Court has said corruption means. 24 After Citizens
United, corruption means practices that "would be covered by bribery laws
if a quid pro quo arrangement were proved," but that Buckley acknowl-
edged "can never be reliably ascertained." 245 Under that narrow definition,
corruption adds little more to bribery than a recognition that criminal bri-
bery in politics is difficult to prove.' Regardless of whether this is a cor-
rect reading of Buckley, it is neither useful in framing arguments about the
purpose of campaign finance laws (many of which originated as corrupt
practices acts that extended beyond bribery laws),247 nor descriptive of its
public meaning.2
The narrowed conception of corruption as simply quid pro quo ar-
rangements is also inconsistent with the Constitution's republican principle
as illuminated by antifactionalism. Starting with Madison again, The Fede-
243 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010).
244 Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909-10 ("When Buckley identified a sufficiently impor-
tant governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was
limited to quid pro quo corruption. The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected
officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt . . . ." (citation omitted)), with Austin, 494 U.S. at
659-60 ("Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas.").
245 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908 (citation omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27
(1976) (per curiam)) (second internal quotation marks omitted).
246 However, the Court did not extend this recognition to the possibility that what appear to be
independent expenditures also can involve quid pro quo arrangements that can never be reliably ascer-
tained. Compare id. at 909, with Robert H. Hall, Free Speech and Free Elections: A North Carolina
Case Study, 3 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 173, 178 n.17, 188-90 (2004) (describing hog industry executives
threatening legislators for votes against their industry, then outspending political parties to defeat tar-
geted legislators).
247 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 963 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("During debates on the earliest
[campaign finance] reform acts, the terms 'corruption' and 'undue influence' were used nearly inter-
changeably." (alteration in original) (quoting Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political
Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 601 (2008)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
248 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 512 (1993) (providing the first
definition of "corruption" as "impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral principle"). In an earlier case
Justice Kennedy, the author of Citizens United, nearly acknowledged this broader meaning in signing a
partial dissent authored by Justice Scalia, also joined by Justice Thomas, that argued for a definition of
"corruptly" as "[a]n act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and
the rights of others. . . . It includes bribery but is more comprehensive; because an act may be corruptly
done though the advantage to be derived from it be not offered by another." United States v. Aguilar,
515 U.S. 593, 616 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Ogle,
613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the dissent quickly
retreated to the narrower legalistic definition concerning "either an unlawful result or a lawful result by
some unlawful method." Id.
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ralist No. 10 did not use "corruption" in the way the Court did in Citizens
United. In Madison's discussion of the dangers of faction, he analogized the
problem of self-interested, factious representatives to the principle that
"[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integri-
ty."249 Compare Madison's understanding of factionalism as corruption with
the Court's view in Citizens United that "[i]t is in the nature of an elected
representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor
the voters and contributors who support those policies."250 Missing the Ma-
disonian point, the Court embraces factionalism as essential to republican-
ism rather than understanding it to be a necessary evil opposed to republi-
canism. Tellingly, Justice Kennedy's McConnell dissent claims that
"[d]emocracy is premised on responsiveness."25' While Madison's constitu-
tional project as described in The Federalist No. 10 was not opposed to
democracy,252 it did attempt to establish a republic in which the system of
representation refined, rather than merely responded to, or worse, concen-
trated, factions.
Scholars applying a range of methods have argued that Madison's an-
tifactional view is closer to what corruption should mean for constitutional
purposes. Originally, as Professor Zephyr Teachout summarizes, "[t]he
Framers were obsessed with corruption," and it had little to do with bri-
bery.253 As Professor Robert Natelson explains, the term was understood at
the framing as "the use of government power and assets to benefit localities
or other special interests ('factions')," not merely illegal personal benefits
like theft.254 "[T]he founding generation valued no public trust duty more
than impartiality," and favoritism toward, or undue influence by, factions-
"corruption" in their terms-violated the public trust even if "not technical-
ly illegal."255 Given that "[c]orruption was among the Constitutional Con-
vention delegates' greatest concerns," Professor Teachout continues, "a
249 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 17, at 79 (emphasis added).
250 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (emphasis added) (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130
S. Ct. 876) (internal quotation marks omitted).
251 Id. (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
252 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 279 (2005) ("When the
word 'democracy' appeared in the Founding era, it was often associated with, rather than defined
against, republicanism-even by Madison himself ... [T]he essence of the Article IV guarantee of each
state's 'Republican' form of government was not to prohibit . .. direct popular participation. Rather, the
big idea was to shore up popular sovereignty." (footnote omitted)).
253 Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 348 (2009).
254 Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original
Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 48 (2003); see also Teachout, supra note 253, at 373-83.
255 Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1150-53
(2004) (second internal quotation marks omitted).
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First Amendment that breathes at the expense of political integrity is proba-
bly not a faithful one. "256
In equally antifactional terms, updated with the incentives-oriented
vocabulary of public choice theory, other scholars have defined corruption
as dependence on narrow interests instead of a representative's constituency
of citizens? Professor Lawrence Lessig frames his detailed contemporary
political diagnosis of "a corrupt Congress" in explicitly republican terms.25 8
He invokes Madison's vision of government's proper "dependence on the
people" to argue that "a representative democracy that developed a compet-
ing dependency, conflicting with the dependency upon the people, would be
'corrupt."' 259 Because representatives "depend upon private wealth to secure
their tenure, they will become responsive to the concerns of that private
wealth, so as to assure its continued supply. . .. But the consequence is a
weakening of the integrity of the system."2 6 This definition does not rely on
quid pro quo; "[n]o one is talking about bribery, or its close cousins."26'
Professor Lessig distinguishes this corruption of politics, as opposed to
corruption of politicians, as "dependence corruption."262
Corruption is, as Professor Daniel Lowenstein describes it, fundamen-
tally a conflict of interest between voters and campaign financiers in which
"the consequences of a decision made in the course of a relationship of trust
are likely to have an effect, not implicit in the trust relationship, on either
the interests of a person with whom the decision-maker has a separate rela-
tionship of trust or on the decision-maker's self-interest. 263 The incentives
for reelection pull at the representative whether the faction doing the cam-
paign spending is a donor or an independent expenditure group. The effects
of such spending are corrupting in the factional sense: Professor Samuel
Issacharoff explains that at a systemic level, "the electoral system leads the
political class to offer private gain from public action to distinct, tightly
organized constituencies, which in turn may be mobilized to keep com-
pliant public officials in office."26
These varying views of corruption all align with the antifactional re-
publican principle of the First Amendment, rather than the faction-
256 Teachout, supra note 253, at 406.
257 Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Accept, 123 HARV. L. REV. 104,
106 (2009) ("The pattern is the increasing dependence of public officials upon private money to secure
tenure. The fear is the corruption such dependency breeds." (footnote omitted)).
258 LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A PLAN TO
STOP IT 127-31 (2011).
259 Id at 128.
260 Lessig, supra note 257, at 106-07.
261 Id. at 106.
262 LESSIG, supra note 258, at 226-47 (titling the section "Two Conceptions of'Corruption'").
263 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply
Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 323 (1989) (footnote omitted).
264 Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 126 (2010).
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facilitating libertarian principle applied in Citizens United. While Citizens
United relied on the libertarian principle in freeing corporations to make
unlimited independent campaign expenditures, a realignment of the consti-
tutional doctrine may clear a space for the republican principle to develop
in the area of disclosure through a broader informational, and anticorrup-
tion, factional interest.265 By declaring that prohibitions on campaign spend-
ing are unconstitutional under strict scrutiny, Citizens United lowers the
constitutional stakes for an antifactional interest in disclosure that need not
be so compelling as to justify speech prohibitions. But by leaving disclosure
as the last generally applicable campaign finance law standing, Citizens
United raises the constitutional stakes for how a broader antifactional inter-
est might justify disclosure under exacting scrutiny.
Disclosure in a post-Citizens United system without campaign finance
prohibitions, reconceived along antifactional lines, can and should accom-
plish more than it did as an adjunct to those prohibitions. Now that the only
compelling interest in campaign finance regulation has been reduced to
something resembling a difficult evidentiary subset of bribery, and direct
prohibitions on campaign spending have become unjustifiable, the original
anticorruption interest may reemerge in its truer antifactional form. This
form should be employed more productively to motivate an ambitious yet
targeted model of campaign finance disclosure that aims not simply to in-
form voters, but also to realize the republican model of self-government.
III. ANTIFACTIONALISM APPLIED
Rooting campaign finance disclosure more deeply in antifactionalism,
and more broadly in anticorruption, can help transition campaign finance
law from a model of disclosure tailored away from First Amendment
threats, to a model of disclosure tailored toward First Amendment values.
A primary contribution of a deeper, broader justification for disclosure
is that it would not immediately change much about the constitutionality of
particular disclosure laws now on the books. In a period of sweeping rea-
lignments elsewhere in the First Amendment doctrine of campaign finance
law, such stability has independent value in itself. After Citizens United,
scholars, advocates, and policymakers have begun to reassess what consti-
tutes effective disclosure.2" As the campaign finance debate at the federal
265 Disclosure may serve these broader interests more effectively than prohibitions, by channeling
less visible direct forms of political influence into the public advocacy where voters are not "mere
bystanders" but "mediate such influence." Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure
and Disclaimer for Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622,
643 (2010).
266 See generally, e.g., Briffault, supra note 15; Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign
Finance Disclosure after Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983 (2011);
Mayer, supra note 15; Noveck, supra note 15; Winik, supra note 265; Jason Kuznicki, November 2010:
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level stagnates due to deadlock in Congress and at the Federal Election
Commission,267 the States continue to serve their role as campaign finance
laboratories.268 The Supreme Court has not stayed this experimentation, and
instead has declined recent facial challenges to state disclosure laws in fa-
vor of further development of the record through as-applied challenges on
remand, as it did in Doe v. Reed.269 Decentralization of campaign finance
debates might allow open constitutional issues "to percolate into a more
coherent doctrine,"270 one that might include a more balanced view of First
Amendment interests.
As legislatures enact new disclosure laws, and courts review them, a
revised justification for disclosure can clarify the constitutional doctrine in
several important and increasingly contested applications. An understand-
ing that the interest in disclosure itself is constitutionally rooted in antifac-
tional concerns refocuses disclosure through a republican lens.
For some disclosure questions, antifactionalism will be more demand-
ing than the current ends of disclosure. Where the informational interest
now is neutral about how a speaker is identified, antifactionalism penetrates
through political committee smokescreens to unmask the faction and its
beneficiaries. Where the informational interest now applies to all speakers
generally, antifactionalism accounts for some speakers as greater factious
threats to the republican form of government than others. Where existing
disclosure laws now might satisfy the informational interest and thereby be
Following the Money: The Law and Ethics of Campaign Finance Disclosure, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 8,
2010, 10:58 AM), http://www.cato-unbound.org/issues/november-2010-following-the-money-the-law-
and-ethics-of-campaign-finance-disclosure/ (noting articles by Bruce Cain amongst others).
267 Eliza Newlin Carney, FEC Shakeup Long Overdue, NAT'L J. (May 11, 2009, 9:17 AM),
http://www.nationaljournal.con/columns/rules-of-the-game/fec-shakeup-long-overdue-200905 11 ("In
case after case, the six-member FEC, which is evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats, has
split 3-3 along party lines. Since the FEC may take no action without a majority, a long list of com-
plaints have been effectively thrown out."); see also Benjamin Weiser & Bill McCallister, The Little
Agency that Can't: Election-Law Enforcer Is Weak by Design, Paralyzed by Division, WASH. POST,
Feb. 12, 1997, at Al.
268 See Life After Citizens United, supra note 26 (explaining that ten states have enacted disclosure
or disclaimer requirements for corporate political expenditures since Citizens United); cf New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Denial of the right to experiment
may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
269 John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2821 (2010); see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450-51 (2008) (disfavoring facial challenges because they "rest on
speculation," ask for "a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts" in a
given case, and "prevent[] laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner
consistent with the Constitution" (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)) (second internal quotation marks omitted)).
270 See William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw. U. L.
REv. 335, 380, 383 (2000) ("Each state has its own political traditions, structures, and exigencies, and
these differences can have profound effects on campaign finance concerns.").
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deemed inoffensive to the First Amendment, the values that motivate anti-
factionalism make effective disclosure a constitutional imperative of popu-
lar sovereignty.
For other disclosure questions, antifactionalism will be more modest
about the means of disclosure. By aiming for consciousness of faction ra-
ther than some ideal of the informed voter, antifactionalism places disclo-
sure laws within a broader system of public deliberation, but does not at-
tempt to bear the entire weight of that system. 271 Current disclosure laws
that focus on name, affiliation, dollar amounts, and any realistic options for
reform through repackaging the same basic data points, find a stronger jus-
tification as antifactional warning systems than as voter education efforts.
Professors Elizabeth Garrett and Daniel Smith have argued an effective
system of disclosure should not aim to fully inform voters of candidates'
and their supporters or opponents' positions, but instead should "structur[e]
the information environment to provide citizens with cues or heuristics that
will help them vote competently with limited data."272 Madison lacked the
vocabulary of behavioral economics, but his reliance on an inherent, even
virtuous popular distrust of faction is consistent with this modest model of
disclosure. As Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan suggest, in
a disclosure-oriented campaign finance system "the normal workings of the
political process by competing candidates or parties and by the press" must
do the rest of the work of rooting out corruption.273
Without incorporating the antifactional insight, the informational in-
terest may also give too much credit to what passes for political advertising.
Saying that a coal mining company sponsored a misleading ad about child
predators, for example, does not so much inform voters as warn them that
factions are at play.274 A focus on a simplified informational interest invites
271 See Robert F. Bauer, Not Just a Private Matter: The Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded
Regulatory System, 6 ELECTION L.J. 38, 38-39 (2007) ("The reliance on the informational interest of
voters assumes wide voter use or interest, neither of which is established. There is something almost
quaint about this view of the average citizen's stake in a database described by the Federal Election
Commission as 'staggering,' unmanageable for even the motivated voter-and which, more generally, is
not without its conceptual difficulties. . . . Stated differently, mandatory disclosure is not a self-
executing reform, but a measure enacted in aid of subsequent regulatory initiatives built around the
information that it produces." (footnote omitted) (quoting FED. ELECTION COMM'N, PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 2 (2004))).
272 Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in
Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 297 (2005). For a comprehensive view of how heuristic cues
can and do create competent voters with assistance from mediating institutions, see Michael S. Kang,
Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclo-
sure Plus, " 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141 (2003).
273 1ssacharoff & Karlan, supra note 21, at 1737; see also Garrett & Smith, supra note 272, at 297
("Mandatory disclosure statutes can be crafted so that they provide relevant information in a timely
fashion and thereby allow information entrepreneurs to bring data to the voters' attention.").
274 See, e.g., Terry Carter, Mud and Money, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2005, at 40, 45 (describing campaign
advertising financed primarily by a coal company executive that criticized incumbent state supreme
4552012]
HeinOnline  -- 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 455 2011-2012
GEO. MASON L. REV.
misguided challenges to robust disclosure laws that, although they may not
be as well tailored to voter information as other policies such as voter
guides, do precisely target the interest in identifying factions.275
Along these lines, the antifactional interest may help solve, or at least
clarify, several puzzles in the First Amendment doctrine of campaign
finance law. Four applications exemplify how an approach guided by the
antifactional interest might lead to clarifications where existing interests do
not. First, targeting interests instead of individuals for disclosure relieves
the latent tension generated by the Court's embrace of political anonymity
in McIntyre. Second, understanding corporations as factions provides a
sounder basis on which to distinguish corporate political actors from others
after Citizens United. Third, the republican concern about faction offers a
coherent rationale for drawing lines between domestic and foreign political
speakers, whether the "foreigners" come from a different district, a different
state, or a different country. Fourth, by recognizing corruption as the private
benefit of factions at the expense of the general welfare, rather than the
personal benefit of an officeholder at the expense of a faction, the antifac-
tional interest calls for at least as robust a disclosure system for issue advo-
cacy as it does for express advocacy of candidates.
A. Individuals
There is a world of difference between Mrs. McIntyre's parking-lot
leaflets and a multimillion dollar independent expenditure campaign waged
through broadcast advertisements underwritten by corporation-funded polit-
ical committees. Rather than measuring that difference by speculating about
the relative burdens of retaliation (as McIntyre does),276 or by the relative
inequality of wealth (as Citizens United suggests the government cannot
do),277 the antifactional interest asks for whom Mrs. McIntyre is speaking.
As it turns out, she was speaking for herself as a citizen, even though she
misleadingly signed some of the leaflets as a "concerned citizens" group
probably to bolster her credibility. McIntyre, therefore, is a weak case for
disclosure because disclosure of her name did not further the antifactional
interest. An individual citizen is a microcosm of Madison's "greater variety
of parties and interests," because she is never solely an employee, a taxpay-
court justice "of casting the deciding vote to let a sex offender take a job in a school"); cf Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256-57 (2009) (holding that due process required recusal of
justice from case involving the executive's coal company when the justice benefitted as a candidate
from the executive's campaign expenditures).
275 See Briffault, supra note 15, at 303 ("Disclosure ought to be much more tightly focused on
informing the public about the major financial actors who give or bundle major sums and on providing
aggregate data about the involvement of interest groups in the political process."); see also id. at 276.
276 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995).
277 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 922 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring).
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er, a parent, or a resident. Such a voter is the object, rather than the subject,
of antifactionalism.278
Recognizing and relying on an antifactional view of the informational
interest would have avoided confusing dicta in McIntyre about the benefit
of anonymity and burden of disclosure regardless of the speaker. 279 For ex-
ample, the Court construed the law at issue as a "statute that prohibits the
distribution of anonymous campaign literature," and, therefore, as an intru-
sion into First Amendment rights under the libertarian view, rather than as a
basic disclaimer law that in most cases furthers First Amendment values
under the republican view. 28 0 Justice Ginsburg's concurrence suggests "in
other, larger circumstances" a state may "require the speaker to disclose its
interest by disclosing its identity," which does recognize that the disclosure
of identity is the means to the end of interest disclosure. 281' But it provides
no basis for distinguishing what those "other, larger circumstances" might
be.
A holding that antifactionalism is unconcerned with Mrs. McIntyre's
political speech is not the same thing as noting, as the Court did, that "the
name and address of the author add little, if anything, to the reader's ability
to evaluate the document's message."282 There are many cases where a
name and business address do help a citizen evaluate a campaign speaker's
message, if by "evaluate" the Court is referring to the voter's consciousness
of the faction behind the message. 283 A corporate manager or major share-
holder who spends a significant amount of his personal wealth on an inde-
pendent expenditure might be acting as a voter, but also could be furthering
278 Professor William McGeveran draws a similar distinction at the individual level in terms of the
privacy costs of disclosure. "[Plrivacy theory focuses on individuals, not collectives." McGeveran,
supra note 24, at 881. Unlike organizations, individuals have "interests in their private personae and
autonomous development of beliefs." Id. at 861.
279 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I can imagine no reason why an ano-
nymous leaflet is any more honorable, as a general matter, than an anonymous phone call or an ano-
nymous letter. It facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very purpose of
the anonymity. There are of course exceptions, and where anonymity is needed to avoid 'threats, ha-
rassment, or reprisals' the First Amendment will require an exemption from the Ohio law. But to strike
down the Ohio law in its general application-and similar laws of 49 other States and the Federal Gov-
ernment-on the ground that all anonymous communication is in our society traditionally sacrosanct,
seems to me a distortion of the past that will lead to a coarsening of the future." (citation omitted) (citing
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958))).
280 Id. at 336 (majority opinion).
281 Id. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
282 Id. at 348-49 (majority opinion).
283 Johnson, Regan, and Wayland argue for tailoring the content of disclosure more narrowly,
noting that for most purposes (including, perhaps, antifactional purposes) a supporter's residential
address is not only highly intrusive but also less relevant than, for example, whether the supporter lives
inside the district or elsewhere. Johnson et al., supra note 33, at 979. Similarly, information about a
supporter's employer is more useful at the aggregate level (which may still be meaningless for political-
ly heterogeneous workplaces) or at high spending levels. Id.
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the factional interests of his corporation.2M Like Madison, the antifactional
interest is skeptical in its outlook on human nature, and errs on the side of
assuming there is a faction to be disclosed at some level of financial signi-
ficance.285 Similarly, as Professor Richard Briffault observes, when "bun-
dlers" express their exceptional interest in a campaign by aggregating ordi-
nary individual contributions, "[b]undler disclosure will help us to better
understand the forces behind a candidate and the individuals likely to have
access to an officeholder." "2
In general, then, antifactionalism is concerned with interest groups ra-
ther than individuals, except when the individuals are likely to be acting on
behalf of the interests themselves. Antifactionalism, therefore, supports
several recent arguments for increasing the monetary thresholds for disclo-
sure of individual campaign spending. 287 Yet it does so because disclosure
of relatively small contributions and expenditures is not substantially re-
lated to the antifactional interest, not because of any special burden on the
speaker.288 In fact, such disclosure can be counterproductive, because low-
level disclosure "threatens to inundate us in a sea of useless data, while
potentially distracting attention from the big donors whose funds play a
more meaningful role in understanding a candidate and her likely place in
the political arena." 289 The antifactional argument does not share the same
general privacy concerns as some of these other arguments against disclo-
sure of individual donors, because (subject to the Socialist Workers Party
exception for retaliation) any countervailing privacy interest presumably
extends to all individual political actors without accounting for the factional
threat they pose.
284 See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Showdown on Emissions Attracts Out-of-Staters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2010, at Al 6 ("[Oil company owners] Charles and David Koch, the billionaires from Kansas who
have played a prominent role in financing the Tea Party movement, donated $1 million to the campaign
to suspend [California's] Global Warming Solutions Act, which was passed four years ago, and signaled
that they were prepared to invest more in the cause.").
285 In addition to "demonstrating an intense degree of support" for a particular interest, large indi-
vidual donor disclosure confers an additional informational benefit "as there is a greater likelihood their
names will mean something to some voters," while imposing a lower privacy cost because they are "less
vulnerable to economic reprisals" and in general "more used to public attention." Briffault, supra note
266, at 1005.
286 Briffault, supra note 15, at 302.
287 See id at 300-01; Mayer, supra note 15, at 281-83; William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's
Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 5-6 (2003).
288 As McGeveran argues, a privacy theory consistent with McIntyre's reading of the First
Amendment "would highlight the central importance of scale" both in terms of the political benefits and
privacy costs of disclosure. McGeveran, supra note 24, at 880.
289 Briffault, supra note 15, at 300-01.
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B. Corporations
A corollary of antifactionalism's reduced concern for individuals is its
increased concern for corporations and other organized interests. A typical
corporation exists for factional purposes. Specifically, a corporation focuses
on narrowly concentrated private interests rather than the broader and more
dispersed interests of individuals. "[I]ts legal loyalties necessarily exclude
patriotism," as Professor Zephyr Teachout puts it. 2% Despite the Court's
rejection of any First Amendment distinction between natural persons and
corporations or other associations in Citizens United, and because of the
direct corporate expenditures that case allows, antifactionalism suggests
that some form of organizational distinction remains meaningful for pur-
poses of disclosure.
The corporate form is the most transparent form of faction, and in a
post-prohibition campaign finance system disclosure of corporate campaign
spending promises to "channel[] corporate influence into public forms of
engagement with the electorate," rather than "forcing the influence into
smoke-filled rooms."29' But the same form also can be used to conceal fac-
tions. Unlike the basic informational interest in identifying "the person or
group who is speaking,"29 2 an antifactional approach accounts for the differ-
ent structures and functions of possible political speakers. Just as an indi-
vidual person might act more or less like a faction in ways that merit differ-
ent disclosure regimes, organizations might be differentiated for disclosure
purposes based on antifactionalism.
Start with the easy case of the business corporation empowered to be-
come a political actor after Citizens United. The corporate form is so valua-
ble in this case because of its efficiency in employing resources to profit its
shareholders. By law, its managers have a fiduciary duty to act in the inter-
est of its shareholders." When it employs those resources to engage in
campaign expenditures, it can be assumed that the expenditures have a fac-
tional function to benefit the shareholders as shareholders through financial
returns rather than as individual citizens through the general welfare.294
290 Teachout, supra note 253, at 393 n.245.
291 Winik, supra note 265, at 644.
292 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010).
293 This may be an important limit on corporate campaign spending. See David Schleicher, The
Parable of the Fox and the Target, ELECTION L. BLOG (Oct. 17, 2010, 12:31 PM)
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/017412.html (comparing the accountability for political spending by
Target and News Corp., and concluding that "[i]f Citizens United made corporate spending more likely,
the money will come mostly from companies with empowered executives, slow growth and weak share-
holder control . . . . If Citizens United made corporate spending more effective by permitting explicit
campaign messages, the effect very well may be to support the preferences of executives, which are not
necessarily the same as the interests of the corporations themselves").
294 Because it is the fiduciary duty to the principals that makes the factionalism of the agent clear,
the same reasoning would apply to partnerships, LLCs, and similar business associations.
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Campaign finance disclosure also can piggyback on securities laws and
other noncampaign disclosure regimes to help follow the money if there is
any doubt as to the source. In the case of the business corporation, then,
disclosure of the corporation discloses the faction with it.295
An understanding of the business corporation as a form of faction also
helps resolve difficulties with the common media exemption from cam-
paign finance laws. A telling feature of the corporate speech holding in
Citizens United is the Court's authority for the proposition that "First
Amendment protection extends to corporations."296 Nearly all of the more
than two dozen cases cited involve First Amendment protection of media
corporations.297 Yet the Court reasoned that nonmedia corporations also
"have the need or the motive to communicate their views," and there is no
clear line to be drawn between a corporate conglomerate that owns media
property and enjoys the exemption and an otherwise identical business that
does not.298 Nor could the Court find any precedent "supporting laws that
attempt to distinguish between corporations which are deemed to be exempt
as media corporations and those which are not."2" As with other corpora-
tions, antifactionalism seeks disclosure of the corporation that is funding
the speech. For the media, such disclosure is inherent in publication: an
endorsement will come under a masthead with a particular editorial tradi-
tion, or on a channel reputed to lean a certain way, or from an internet site
known to have a particular perspective, all of which can warn of factions in
the context of the media outlet's broader public reputation. Media corpora-
tions trade on clearly established editorial interests in a way other business-
es do not.
Not all corporations, however, are business corporations. Before Citi-
zens United mooted line drawing exercises among corporations, the Su-
preme Court developed an exemption from campaign expenditure prohibi-
tions for voluntary associations that are incorporated "for the express pur-
pose of promoting political ideas." " For purposes of antifactionalism, the
295 Alternatively, in terms of costs rather than benefits of disclosure, the essential publicity of the
corporate form in the marketplace "explains why corporations lack the kind of dignitary privacy inter-
ests that justify the protection of individual speech against the risk of retaliation." Winik, supra note
265, at 661-64.
296 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899.
297 See id at 899-900.
298 Id. at 906.
299 Id. at 905.
300 See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1986). One
confusing legacy of Massachusetts Citizens has not been mooted. There, the Supreme Court prohibited
the imposition of "the full panoply of regulations that accompany status as a political committee under
the Act," id. at 262, to a political organization "whose major purpose is not campaign advocacy." Id. at
252; cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976) (per curiam). As Justice O'Connor predicted, see supra
Part I.A.2, courts are split on to what extent the "major purpose" test restricts disclosure of members.
Compare Human Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
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business corporation and the political advocacy corporation are actually
quite similar. Although they have different primary revenue models (sales
for business corporations, memberships for political corporations), they
both have associated in a common cause, delegating to management the
authority to act on behalf of that cause.30 ' Again, to the extent the corpora-
tion clearly serves "the express purpose of promoting political ideas," and
its managers are bound to act in furtherance of those ideas, disclosure of the
political corporation is as transparent from an antifactional perspective as
disclosure of the business corporation.
This transparency of corporate faction also suggests that disclosure of
ordinary individual members of these political organizations generally adds
little to the antifactional interest in information. As with individuals, how-
ever, some members who spend a significant amount of resources support-
ing the organization suggest factional, rather than civic, involvement. For
example, a handful of business executives who establish a vaguely named
campaign front group with little or no other public support302 are more like-
ly making an investment in narrow factional interests than the dues paying
political organization member or even the individual philanthropist willing
to stand by his ad in person. There is another case for membership disclo-
sure, too, when corporations are formed not to more efficiently advance its
shareholders or members financial or political interests, but to conceal, or
coordinate with, another underlying faction. Professors Garrett and Smith
usefully distinguish between "notorious" organizations whose political
stances are well known to their political opponents and the public, and
"veiled political actors," which are organizations used to avoid disclosure
of the interests-the factions-behind the veil.303 While disclosure of indi-
vidual shareholders or members may in rare instances present threats of
retaliation within the Socialist Workers Party exception, the strong faction
inherent in the corporate form argues for piercing that veil with rigorous
a group with "'a' major purpose of political advocacy" can be required to disclose as a political commit-
tee), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011), with N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 287 (4th
Cir. 2008) (holding that political committee disclosure may only apply to a group with the primary
purpose of political advocacy).
301 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring).
302 See, e.g., Peter Overby, Who Writes the Check? Group Wants Voters to Know, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/22/134746513/who-writes-the-check-group (de-
scribing in a campaign advertising disclaimer that "Concerned Taxpayers of America" actually was
funded by "a million-dollar front group financed by just two guys-a Maryland businessman and the
head of a New York hedge fund").
303 See Garrett & Smith, supra note 272, at 296 (defining "VPAs" as "[c]omplicated arrangements
consisting of nonprofit corporations, unregulated entities, and unincorporated groups can lead to struc-
tures resembling Russian matryoshka dolls, where each layer is removed only to find another layer
obscuring the real source of money").
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disclosure laws to unmask corporate or otherwise organized members of
political organizations.3 "
C. "Foreigners"
The most enigmatic question left open by Citizens United is "whether
the Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals
or associations from influencing our Nation's political process."30 The oth-
erwise valid disclosure laws upheld by Citizens United perforce would ap-
ply to foreign political actors. But the practicalities of enforcing existing
and new disclosure laws, the fact that state and local campaign finance laws
must address "foreigners" already, and the prospect that noncitizen individ-
uals or organizations might one day participate in campaigns,3 " raise novel
issues. The Court's arguably incoherent hesitation to extend the logic of its
holding in Citizens United to foreign individuals or associations.0 . leads to
an important question about how a republican view of the First Amend-
ment, and an antifactional view of campaign finance disclosure, would con-
sider distinctions drawn on the basis of a campaign speaker's status as a
"foreigner" of one kind or another.
A suggestion of an answer may be found in The Federalist No. 10. In
its penultimate paragraph, Madison explained that under republican gov-
ernment, "[t]he influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration
through the other States."0" Under federalism, any "improper or wicked
project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a par-
ticular member of it, in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely
to taint a particular county or district than an entire State."3" As the context
of the Guarantee Clause suggests, the States' republican form of govern-
ment is as important a part of the Constitution's firewall against dangerous
factions as the United States' protection of each of the States against inva-
sion or domestic violence.3 o The same republican principle that would sa-
304 But see Stephen M. Hoersting, When Capitalists Need Socialist Workers, NAT'L REV. ONLINE
(May 6, 2011 11:32 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/266623 (arguing that traditional
judicial deference to economic legislation was premised on businesses' access to the political process,
and that disclosure of corporate campaign speech threatens to chill that access).
305 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
3 See Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, Civil No. 10-1766 (BMK)(RMU)(RMC), 2011 WL
3443833, at *7, *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2011) (dismissing a challenge to the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C.
§ 441 e (2006) as applied to prohibit political contributions and independent expenditures by foreign
nationals who lawfully reside and work in the United States).
307 See Hasen, supra note 185, at 605.
308 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 17, at 84.
309 id
310 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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feguard the United States against foreign influence also would safeguard
the States against regional factions."' Foreigners, meaning political actors
from outside the republic's commonweal at the national, state, or local lev-
el, are, in a word, factions.
Thus understood, an antifactional view of the informational interest
need not rely on potentially pernicious classifications of national or regional
identity to justify distinctions between disclosure of foreign and domestic
individuals or associations. These distinctions have become more salient
recently at the state level, where doubly factious out-of-state political or-
ganizations have spent heavily on ballot issues. One court summarized the
intuition underlying the distinction in Madisonian terms: "[s]urely Califor-
nia voters are entitled to information as to whether it is even citizens of
their own republic who are supporting or opposing a California ballot
measure."312 There is a deeper republican point: such foreign factions are
especially dangerous because it is a direct attack on the federalist immune
system against faction."' A recent study of a South Dakota ballot measure,
where as much as eighty percent of the funding came from "foreign" (out-
of-state) sources, concluded that "if the out-of-state money affects the out-
come of a referendum in a way that would be different from how South
Dakotans alone may have voted, then the whole notion of horizontal fede-
ralism and state autonomy may be undermined."314 The exact extent of for-
eign spending in that election was unknown due to weaknesses in the dis-
closure laws."'
311 Again, corruption is not too strong a term to call this influence. The Framers' "obsession with
foreign influence derived from a fear that foreign powers and individuals had no basic investment in the
well-being of the country." Teachout, supra note 253, at 393 n.245.
312 ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1211 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
313 For a strong statement of the stakes involved, see Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of
Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 769-70
(1995) ("These nationwide crosscutting cleavages make American federalism stable because they give it
a Madisonian plurality of interest groups, no one of which is likely to terrorize the others on a perma-
nent basis... .There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to
promote peace, prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document.").
314 Patrick M. Garry et al., Raising the Question of Whether Out-Of-State Political Contributions
May Affect a Small State's Political Autonomy: A Case Study of the South Dakota Voter Referendum on
Abortion, 55 S.D. L. REV. 35, 46 (2010). The Alaska Supreme Court expressed a similar view in consi-
dering limits on corporate campaign expenditures:
Alaska has a long history of both support from and exploitation by nonresident interests. Its
beauty and resources have long been lightning rods for social, developmental, and environ-
mental interests. More than 100 years of experience, stemming from days when Alaska was
only a district and later a territory without an elected governor or voting representation in
Congress, have inculcated deep suspicions of the motives and wisdom of those who, from
outside its borders, wish to remold Alaska and its internal policies for dealing with social or
resource issues. Outside influence plays a legitimate part in Alaska politics, but it is not one
that Alaskans embrace without reservation.
State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 617 (Alaska 1999).
315 Garry et al., supra note 314, at 46. See generally LINDA KING, INDECENT DISCLOSURE: PUBLIC
ACCESS TO INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE INFORMATION AT THE STATE LEVEL (2007).
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Antifactionalism provides strong support for taking account of foreign
political actors at every level and for disclosure laws that draw clear distinc-
tions based on whether and to what extent political speech is funded from
outside the relevant political community. Given the role of the United
States in the world, and the role of foreign nationals and corporations in the
United States, foreigners have strong interests in American foreign and
domestic policy. In a challenge against federal prohibitions on campaign
spending from foreign sources, or special state disclosure rules for "for-
eign" out-of-state corporations or nonresidents,"' the republican antifac-
tional principle could distinguish disclosure of foreign political actors by
acknowledging these interests as the factions they are.
This necessity of federalism to the republican plan suggests another
lesson from antifactionalism. The increased susceptibility to faction at suc-
cessively lower levels of government may argue for a more deferential
treatment of campaign finance law at the state and local levels, at least
when the law itself does not itself entrench a particular faction. A review of
First Amendment challenges in federal courts suggests the opposite is oc-
curring, with state and local laws less likely to survive the same level of
scrutiny applied to federal laws."' Professor Adam Winkler, the review's
author, suggests "[p]erhaps the linear descent in survival rates as one moves
from the national to the local level is a reflection of Madison's theory of
faction," with courts viewing local laws as more likely "to invade the rights
of other citizens."' In the campaign finance area, at least, an antifactional
perspective may resist this trend. Where campaign finance laws serve the
republican principle of the First Amendment by increasing the citizens'
consciousness of factions in political discourse, a truer Madisonian ap-
proach may be more deferential to disclosure at the state and local levels
that lack other structural impediments to faction available at the federal
level.
D. Issue Advocacy
Finally, antifactionalism requires increased attention to disclosure of
"issue advocacy" expenditures. The distinction of "issue advocacy" from
"express advocacy" arose in Buckley, when the Court narrowly construed
316 See, e.g., Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 617 (rejecting challenge to rules limiting
campaign contributions by non-residents); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.093 (2009) (separate
reporting requirements for "[o]ut-of-state political committees").
317 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in
the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 857 (2006) ("In campaign speech cases, where the survival
rate was only 24 percent, all of the federal campaign speech laws adjudicated under strict scrutiny were
upheld and only a minority of state laws survived.").
318 Id. at 822 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 17, at 83) (second internal quotation
marks omitted).
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the federal disclosure requirement applicable to expenditures "for the pur-
pose of . . . influencing" a candidate election to address vagueness prob-
lems."' Under Buckley, independent expenditure disclosure applied only to
"communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate"3 20 and not to "groups engaged purely in issue discus-
sion."3 2' The Court soon expressed the logic implicit in the distinction when
it rejected an anticorruption interest in limiting ballot issue campaign ex-
penditures. "The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate
elections simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue."3 22 The
disclosure of issue advocacy "rests," according to the skeptical Court in
McIntyre, "on different and less powerful state interests" than disclosure of
candidate campaign expenditures.323
The Court in Citizens United, by concluding that campaign expendi-
ture limits never can rely on the newly narrowed anticorruption interest,
leveled the doctrinal distinction between express advocacy in candidate
campaigns and issue advocacy in those campaigns and others. The Court
already had weakened the distinction in McConnell through its rejection of
"a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy."3 24
Although Citizens United overruled McConnell on expenditure limits, it
reaffirmed its holding supporting disclosure "[h]aving rejected the notion"
that issue advocacy is a separate constitutional category.3 25 Yet even after
Citizens United, one court has noted "[t]he constitutional basis for this con-
cern with distinguishing between laws that regulate advocacy of a candi-
date's election and those that regulate pure issue discussion has never been
entirely clear."326
An antifactional approach helps reconcile the treatment of both forms
of advocacy. Just as the Court's reduction of "corruption" to little more
than bribery provides an opportunity to reclaim that word's broader antifac-
tional sense in support of candidate campaign disclosure,327 it also opens a
319 Buckley v. Valeco, 424 U.S. 1, 76-82 (1976) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting
Amendments to Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1272 (1974)
(current version at 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i) (2006))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
320 Id. at 80 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 44 & n.52 (providing examples of express advocacy
as containing words such as "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," "Smith for Congress,"
"vote against," "defeat," "reject" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
321 Id. at 79.
322 First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) (citations omitted); see also
Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298 (1981).
323 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 (1995).
324 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
325 Id. at 194; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915 ("[W]e reject Citizens United's contention that the
disclosure requirements must be limited to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advoca-
cy.").
326 Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 53 (1st Cir. 2011).
327 See supra Part II.B.
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door to rediscovering a similar antifactional interest supporting issue advo-
cacy disclosure. Once again, the antifactional interest is concerned with the
problem of private benefit of the faction at the expense of the general wel-
fare, not the private benefit of the officeholder at the expense of the faction.
Faction can corrupt politics regardless of whether its vehicle is a public
official seeking reelection or a private faction petitioning for legislation or a
ballot issue. Thus, the antifactional interest in disclosure is at least as strong
for issue advocacy expenditures as it is for candidate advocacy expendi-
tures. Such an interest may have at least two useful applications: ballot is-
sues and lobbying.
Ballot issue advocacy, a form of "pure democracy" that bypasses Mad-
ison's "scheme of representation" cure for faction,328 poses a greater con-
cern under the original republican conception of corruption than it does
under the transactional conception of corruption that now prevails. First,
direct democracy lacks the means "to refine and enlarge the public views by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens."329 Instead,
the public forum for debate and deliberation consists almost exclusively of
campaign speech by the interested parties-the factions-themselves.
Second, as the preceding discussion of "foreign" political actors suggests,330
direct democracy is entirely a creature of state and local governments
whose lesser "number of citizens and extent of territory" make them poten-
tially more susceptible to "factious combinations" than the federal govern-
ment."'
Courts miss these insights when they view campaign finance regula-
tion generally, and disclosure specifically, as policy tools primarily directed
at corruption of public officials rather than at corruption of the political
process itself. In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.,
for example, the Court combined "deter[ring] fraud and diminish[ing] cor-
ruption" into one important interest.332 In the same minimalist mode that
marked her concurrence in McIntyre,333 Justice Ginsburg's opinion notes
that "[t]o inform the public 'where [the] money comes from,' we reiterate,
the State legitimately requires sponsors of ballot initiatives to disclose"
payments to petition circulators. 334 Nothing more than a cite to the "infor-
mational interest" discussion in Buckley v. Valeo, itself a candidate cam-
paign case, suggests why or how that disclosure requirement is legitimate in
the context of a ballot issue campaign.
328 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 17, at 81.
329 Id. at 82.
330 See supra Part III.C.
331 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 17, at 83.
332 Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 204-05 (1999).
333 See supra Part. I.A.I.
334 Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 205 (second alteration in original) (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (per curiam)).
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Justice O'Connor, who had previously anticipated the confusion gen-
erated by the Court's inattention to disclosure in Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, again prodded the Court in American Constitutional Law Foundation
to more thoroughly consider the interest in disclosure. Dissenting from the
Court's invalidation of petition circulator disclosures required during the
petitioning process, Justice O'Connor defended such disclosure in ballot
issue campaigns as "more than legitimate . . . . they are substantial.""' In an
elaboration of the broader anticorruption disclosure rationale expressed in
Buckley,"' her dissent invokes earlier republican themes in arguing that
disclosure is an "essential cornerstone" of campaign regulation and "fun-
damental to the political system."337 Effective disclosure of an issue's finan-
cial supporters "allows members of the public to evaluate the sincerity or,
alternatively, the potential bias of any circulator,"' or for that matter any
message sponsored by the proposing interest group. Echoing Madison's
system of obstacles "to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wish-
es of an unjust and interested majority,"" the dissent quotes a study de-
scribing disclosure as "an automatic regulator, inducing self-discipline
among political contenders and arming the electorate with important infor-
mation."34 Nowhere does Justice O'Connor discount the importance of
disclosure in a ballot issue campaign; the same substantial antifactional
interest obtains in a campaign where there is no candidate to corrupt, but
still a faction to disclose.
One recent note observes that the Court's reliance on an ambiguous
"electoral integrity" interest in Doe v. Reed "almost guarantees that there
will be a flourishing of litigation in lower courts addressing a range of regu-
latory issues-including disclosure-in the context of state-organized ballot
initiatives and beyond."341 To the extent these cases challenge disclosure of
a ballot issue's financial supporters rather than the separate issue of disclo-
sure of petitioners themselves, the surest footing for courts going forward is
found in Justice O'Connor's partial dissent in American Constitutional Law
Foundation and the deeper republican view of "electoral integrity" in ballot
issue campaigns as disclosing faction rather than just deterring fraud or
bribery.
335 Id. at 226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
336 See supra Part I.B.2.
337 Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part) (quoting
HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & BRIAN A. HAGGERTY, THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT: AFTER A
DECADE OF POLITICAL REFORM 39 (1981), and HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS:
MONEY, ELECTIONS, & POLITICAL REFORM 164 (4th ed. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
338 Id. at 224.
339 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 17, at 84.
340 Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part) (quoting
ALEXANDER & HAGGERTY, supra note 337, at 37) (internal quotation marks omitted).
341 Chesa Boudin, Note, Publius and the Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History of Anonymous
Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 2140, 2175 (2011).
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A final variation of issue advocacy that the antifactional interest may
help clarify is lobbying regulation. The Supreme Court has not often scruti-
nized lobbying regulation, although laws governing lobbying practices have
come under increased scrutiny in lower courts after Citizens United.32 Re-
cent lobbying laws, and courts' review of them, have focused on the narrow
form of quid pro quo corruption defined in Citizens United.3" For example,
Connecticut recently passed its strict contribution prohibition on contractors
and certain lobbyists "in response to a series of scandals in which contrac-
tors illegally offered bribes, 'kick-backs,' and campaign contributions to
state officials in exchange for contracts with the state."" Not only has that
background of corruption not saved such strict laws, however," but as this
Article has argued in other areas these new prohibitions and the court's
review of them too narrowly define the means and ends of campaign
finance regulation. As far as the antifactional interest is concerned, lobby-
ing poses a more significant threat of corrupting politics than lobbyists do
of corrupting politicians. "Lobbyists are a key means by which interest
groups pursue their goals in the political arena," Professor Hasen observes,
but the methods they use to pursue their goals are the most troubling. "
Lobbying skews policy toward "those with resources and with narrow (as
opposed to diffuse) interests in particular legislation," because they "can
more easily overcome collective action problems and engage in political
activity" to seek rents at the expense of the general welfare with demonstr-
able national economic costs."
While there is a much broader debate about lobbying regulation in
general,'" and about stronger structural prohibitions on lobbyist-politician
relations in particular,3" the antifactional interest, as this Article conceives
it, suggests that the debate should not lose sight of disclosure as a means of
facilitating public consciousness of lobbying's factional threat to republican
government. Even more than campaign finance disclosure, lobbying disclo-
sure may require significant reconstruction to accomplish its ends under the
conditions of modern politics. Here, Citizens United sounds an encouraging
342 See, e.g., Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 2010) (invalidating state
law prohibiting lobbyists from contributing to candidate campaigns).
343 See, e.g., id. at 206-07.
344 Id at 200.
345 Id. at 207 (holding that Connecticut's ban on lobbyist contributions is not closely drawn to the
anticorruption interest).
346 Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2012) (manuscript at 2).
347 Id. (manuscript at 5).
348 Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Admin. Law and Regulatory Practice, Lobbying Law in the Spot-
light: Challenges and Proposed Improvements (Jan. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/2011_build/administrativelaw/lobbying task f
orce report 010311.authcheckdam.pdf.
349 See Hasen, supra note 346 (manuscript at 3-5).
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note with its comparison of campaign finance disclosure with "registration
and disclosure requirements on lobbyists."350 There the Court cites Harriss,
which announces the clearest modern statement of the antifactional interest
in disclosure both in terms of its broad ends, "full realization of the Ameri-
can ideal of government by elected representatives," and modest means, "to
know who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much.""'
In lobbying law and elsewhere in campaign finance law, effectively pur-
suing these broad ends through narrow means may best ensure the fullest
realization of the First Amendment's republican purpose consistent with its
libertarian command after Citizens United.
CONCLUSION
Citizens United provides an opportunity to reconsider the relationship
between campaign finance disclosure and the First Amendment. Unless that
relationship is strengthened at a constitutional level, however, this opportu-
nity may be lost beneath an accretion of poorly developed doctrine. New
legislation and litigation is already testing the disclosure issue in the lower
courts and will arrive at the Supreme Court in due course. Against these
challenges, the shallow roots of the informational interest now underlying
disclosure may not fully support the kinds of rules necessary to make dis-
closure of sophisticated political actors effective. One way to deepen those
roots is to recover the republican principle that supports the First Amend-
ment and recognize in that principle an antifactional purpose that supports
disclosure as a key constitutional protection for our system of self-
government.
350 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010).
351 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
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